Edward M. Gabriel: Beating on a Dead Camel

Oh I know I said I wasn’t going to bore you with a detailed analysis of Edward M. Gabriel’s article in National Interest supporting Morocco’s autonomy plan . However, after Ambassador Gabriel honored me with a comment on my humble blog, I feel impelled to respond to his challenge.

“I stand by the content of my article,” writes Mr. Gabriel.

OK

Here are some of the statements he stands by (his words in bold):

“For centuries, nomadic tribes of the Sahara–known collectively as Sahrawis—subsisted in the vast expanse of the Sahara (across present-day Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Mali) while pledging allegiance to the Sultanate of Morocco. The colonial occupation of the region by Spain, and subsequent borders imposed in the area, did not take into account the unique cultural, political and economic identity of the Sahrawi people, who had always been inextricably tied to the south of Morocco.”

I’m a little confused here. If the Sahrawi tribes subsisting in the “vast expanse of the Sahara (across present-day Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania and Mali)” all pledged allegiance to the Sultanate of Morocco and if these pledges really constituted bonds of sovereignty that justify Morocco’s invasion and occupation of the Western Sahara, then why isn’t Morocco trying to recover their Algerian, Mauritanian, and Malian Saharas also. Actually, after Morocco got its independence from France, the nationalist Istiqlal party did claim all of this area (and even some of Senegal), but these grandiose claims haven’t seen the light of day for a while. Why Mr. Gabriel seems to be dredging up the long-discredited greater-Moroccan thesis is unclear. And if he truly believes in this thesis, why is Mr. Gabriel picking only on the Western Sahara?

“During the Cold War, following Spain’s withdrawal from the Sahara, a separatist revolutionary group known as the Polisario Front, backed by the USSR, Algeria, Cuba and Libya, attempted to wrest the region away from Morocco, which had reestablished its traditional sovereignty in the former Spanish colony.”

I wonder whether that is “separatist revolutionary” as in the thirteen colonies. In any event, I have discussed the erroneous use of “separatist” elsewhere. No country recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over the WS, so there is nothing to separate from. In his attempt to place the Polisario on the wrong side in the Cold War, Mr. Gabriel includes the USSR as one of their backers. In fact, the USSR always refused to back the Polisario either financially or militarily in order to protect its huge 30-year phosphates deal concluded with the kingdom in 1978. Even diplomatic backing was lacking, which can be seen from the fact the USSR (and Russia for that matter) has never recognized the Polisario Front. And Mr. Gabriel seems to have forgotten that during the Cold War the number of countries that “backed” the Polisario with official recognition reached into the seventies. And of course Mr. Gabriel’s claim that Morocco “reestablished its traditional sovereignty in the former Spanish colony” was debunked by the International Court of Justice and discredited by the de facto refusal of the world community to recognize any such “traditional sovereignty.”

“A United Nations ceasefire was established in 1991, but since that time various efforts to reach a political solution to the issue have failed.”

The 1991 cease-fire agreement that was signed by both parties and which, among other things, called for a referendum on independence or inclusion in Morocco WAS a “political solution.” If Morocco had honored its agreement to hold a referendum with an electorate based on the 1975 census, the Western Sahara crisis would have been over a long time ago. Gabriel’s contention that “efforts to reach a political solution … have failed” is a feeble attempt to cover up the fact that a political solution was reached years ago and the reality that Morocco bears full responsibility for not allowing implementation of that solution.

“The impasse reflected the Polisario Front’s firm stance that only independence will suffice, while Morocco insisted upon reintegration of its land and people within its national borders.”

This is just wrong. The Polisario has NEVER taken a “stance,” and certainly never a “firm” one, that “only independence will suffice.” The Polisario has always said they would abide by whatever the inhabitants of the territory voted for in a referendum – be it inclusion in Morocco, autonomy, or independence. Their firm stance is that only a referendum on independence will suffice. Similarly, if Morocco has always “insisted upon reintegration of its land and people within its national borders,” why then did Hassan II sign an agreement setting up a referendum on independence?

In assessing this article, the sections that I have put under the microscope constitute only the edge of the Sahara of Mr. Gabriel’s dishonesty. As is usually the case with this kind of writing, all the facts and points of international law that that don’t fit into or that contradict his pro-Moroccan line are just left out.

And so, having fabricated a totally misleading and bogus history of the conflict, Mr. Gabriel moves on to make his case for Morocco’s autonomy proposal. You know right away where he is going when he writes, “This decision [to present the autonomy plan] was reached through a wide-ranging discussion among the stakeholders in Morocco….” Come on Mr. Gabriel, who cares what they think in Morocco; they are after all the invader and occupier. It’s what they think in El Ayoun or Tindouf that matters.

I find his case far from convincing, but here I will really truly refrain from delving into the minutia of his arguments. Mr. Gabriel can blather on all he wants about how Western Saharan autonomy is the best solution for all the ills of Morocco and the Maghreb, but his arguments are all irrelevant because of his total rejection of the Western Saharans’ right to de-colonial self-determination.

The Polisario has already rejected Morocco’s plan and after two meetings in Manhasset has stood firm in its refusal to discuss autonomy outside of the context of a referendum on independence. Mr. Gabriel’s article in support of Morocco’s autonomy plan is an attempt to create a sand storm to blind the American reader to the truth and reality of the Western Sahara issue. Or as Bob Dylan might have said ("Man in the Long Black Coat" in Oh Mercy), “Somebody is out there beating on a dead camel.”

I thank Mr. Gabriel again for making his comment on my blog. His excuse that he divulged his affiliation with the Moroccan government with National Interest and they refrained to mention it with his article is I think rather lame. In published opinion pieces, authors who have a financial interest in the propagation of a particular point of view have an ethical obligation to divulge that interest – either in the article or in a biographical note. Mention of Mr. Gabriel’s paid relationship with the kingdom of Morocco initially appeared in neither place.

Edward M. Gabriel, Piranha

There’s nothing like a few days of stalking large- and smallmouth bass, stripers, and northern pike to take my mind off of the situation in the Western Sahara. As I settled back to my desk after a relaxing fishing vacation in Maine, I came upon an August 31^st article on National Interest Online by the old piranha, former American ambassador to Morocco Edward M. Gabriel, titled Inside Track: Resolving the Western Sahara Saga. Oh well, the soothing pristine calm of the Kennebec is all of a sudden a distant memory.

I will not bore you with a detailed analysis of this piece of Moroccan propaganda; there is absolutely nothing that distinguishes it from the rubbish coming out of Rabat, or from the spinmeisters at Edelman, or the poisoned pens of others who have sold out to the Moroccans such as Frederick Vreeland and Robert Holley. Let me just say that it is very much what we have come to expect from former American diplomats to Morocco who now make a pleasant living on Rabat’s payroll.

In the latest (available online) Report of the Attorney General to the Congress of the United States on the Administration of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amended, for the six months ending June 30, 2006, we learn that Mr. Gabriel is somewhat of a double-dipper, as he turns up as a registered foreign agent for Morocco under both his own company, Gabriel Company, LLC, and Robert Holley’s chop shop, Moroccan-American Center for Policy, Inc.(MACP) To dispel the notion that he might have gotten a real job since that last report, Mr. Gabriel in May of this year prefaced his remarks at a Western Sahara conference at the Center for American Progress (CAP) in Washington, DC, by divulging that he was still taking money from the Government of Morocco.

Mr. Gabriel over the last couple years has been a fixture on the Moroccan propaganda circuit showing up regularly at MACP, Edelman, and National Clergy Council events. Always seated next to his fellow Moroccan foreign agents, he struts his ambassadorial status in a lame attempt to give some stamp of legitimacy to the crass dishonesty of these propaganda shows. His article is, similarly, nothing more than propaganda aimed at influencing American public opinion to accept Morocco’s illegal occupation of the Western Sahara.

It is mindboggling that Mr. Gabriel should have the audacity to write his article in support of Morocco’s autonomy plan without divulging his relationship with the Moroccan government – especially in view of a similar stunt in the New York Times back in March by another former American ambassador to Morocco, “Fricky” Vreeland. In Vreeland’s case, the Times issued a correction three weeks later stating that he was “chairman of a solar-energy company that has had contracts with the Moroccan government” and the article “should have more fully disclosed the background of the author.” It is my hope that National Interest Online will exhibit a similar concern for transparency and journalistic ethics by adding a disclaimer to Mr. Gabriel’s article.

I am pleased to report that National Interest has amended their biographical note about Mr. Gabriel, and it now reads, "Edward M. Gabriel is a former U.S. Ambassador to Morocco and a consultant to the Moroccan government."

I. William Zartman & the Final Solution of the Sahrawi Problem

On 16 May 2007, the Washington-based Center for Strategic & International Studies presented an article in its Africa Policy Forum series titled "Western Sahara – Continuing Standoff." The author of the article, Anna Theofilopoulou, is described as follows:

Anna Theofilopoulou covered Western Sahara and North Africa in the Department of Political Affairs of the United Nations from 1994 to 2006. She worked closely with former U.S. Secretary of State, James A. Baker, III throughout his appointment as Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General on Western Sahara – from March 1997 until his resignation in June 2004.

Ms. Theofilopoulou clearly has an intimate familiarity with the Western Sahara issue, and her analysis of the present situation is one of the better ones that I have read in a while. The whole article is well worth reading, but for the purposes of this post I quote her concluding paragraph:

The Security Council has chosen to deal with this issue by adopting the suggestion by the Secretary-General for negotiations between the parties without preconditions. This is not the first time that the Security Council, when confronted with a difficult choice and crucial disagreements among its members, has bounced the issue back into the court of the Secretary-General. There has been giddy talk among Morocco’s supporters about a “breakthrough,” since the parties have indeed agreed to direct talks. However, given the irreconcilable nature of the positions that each side has brought to the table, what are the chances for these talks to bring about any results? At best, the latest decision by the Security Council promises several more years of stalemate.

I agree with this assessment and can only add that, at worst, war in some form could return to the Maghreb. The Africa Policy Forum actively solicits comments and what really caught my eye was this comment by I. William Zartman directly following the article:

· 1. I William Zartman | May 16th, 2007 at 10:19 pm

Ana [sic] Theofilopoulou’s piece on the Western Sahar [sic] is cogent and well informed, but it stops where it should continue. Sure, Algeria needs to be brought into a settlement. But what settlement? Morocco’s proposal for autonomy is the only proposal ever made by one of the parties including Algeria) that departs from extreme positions and seeks the middle. In so doing, Morcco [sic] takes enormous risks: 1) that its autonomy proposal be viewed as a step toward independence, like East Timor or Palestine, as the UN Secretariat tends to view the solution, and 2) that its proposal be viewed as the new starting position and Algeria then proposing to split the difference, landing on te [sic] Polisario side of the “crest of sovereignty.” The challenge is to flesh out and implement the autonomy plan as a final solution, and inthat [sic] the US, France and Spain are not wrong in supporting the plan. Theofilopoulou does not tell us what to support, only that Algeria (and the PLS) need to be brought in. Into what? Autonomy is a good proposal and we should stick to it.

While fully aware of Mr. Zartman’s lofty reputation as Professor of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution and Director of the Conflict Management Program at Johns Hopkins University, I am somewhat baffled and disturbed by some of his comments regarding Ms. Theofilopoulou’s article and on the Western Saharan conflict in general.

His basic problem with the article is that it does not take a stand, that “it stops where it should continue.” What he means by this becomes immediately clear. He writes, “Morocco’s proposal for autonomy is the only proposal ever made by one of the parties (including Algeria) that departs from extreme positions and seeks the middle.” I find Mr. Zartman’s idea that the autonomy plan “seeks the middle” totally off base. The Polisario Front and Morocco signed a UN-brokered agreement in 1991 calling for a referendum on independence. Given that the UN had been calling for this referendum since the 1960s when the Western Sahara was designated a non-self-governing territory and given that both parties agreed to the referendum, I am at a loss to understand how this proposal to hold a referendum could be considered an “extreme position.”

In fact, for the decade after 1991 the holding of a referendum on independence WAS the “middle,” and both parties considered autonomy “extreme.” A quote by John Bolton, who helped James Baker in the negotiations, is illustrative:

…when Secretary Baker went to the region and asked the King, asked the government of Morocco, asked the leadership of the POLISARIO, "What do you want?" They said, without hesitation and without equivocation, "We want a free and fair referendum." "Want to talk about autonomy?" "No, we don't want to talk about autonomy. We want to talk about a referendum. (Defense Forum Foundation, 1998 Congressional Defense and Foreign Policy Forum, “Resolving the Western Sahara Conflict”)

Mr. Zartman’s view that autonomy is now a commendable middle position that should be supported by all totally ignores the history of how and why Morocco finally rejected the referendum on independence that after all both parties had agreed to. In several stages, Morocco quite simply came to the realization that it would or could lose any referendum, no matter how many concessions were made by the Polisario (and they made several) and no matter how many thousands of pro-Moroccan settlers were added to the voter list. In fact, the Polisario’s acceptance of James Baker’s last plan in 2003 (Baker II) was an incredibly risky concession in that the Moroccan settlers that would be allowed to vote in Baker’s referendum greatly outnumbered the indigenous Sahrawi. And even with the numbers heavily stacked in its favor, Rabat, apparently still convinced it could lose, rejected Baker II, took any possibility of independence off the table, and declared autonomy a noble compromise.

Mr. Zartman makes much of Morocco’s risks in proposing autonomy. For instance he states, “Morcco [sic] takes enormous risks: 1) that its autonomy proposal be viewed as a step toward independence, like East Timor or Palestine, as the UN Secretariat tends to view the solution.” Mr. Zartman is quite right that the UN Secretariat groups the Western Sahara with East Timor and Palestine as places that under clear international law are (and in the case of East Timor were) entitled to independence. What Mr. Zartman doesn’t make clear is why the Western Sahara should be treated differently from the other two, and in particular East Timor. East Timor before independence fell precisely under the same legal framework as the Western Sahara. Both were categorized as non-self-governing territories with the right to self-determination with independence as an option. I would be interested in knowing why Mr. Zartman apparently accepts East Timor’s independence but rejects the possibility of the Western Sahara’s. In any event, his flippant dismissal of international law (“as the UN Secretariat tends to view the solution”) in favor of Morocco’s autonomy plan is disturbing. And in the final analysis what Mr. Zartman is saying is that Morocco's "enormous" risk is that in the end international law just might prevail. How horrible.

In addition, on the question of risk, Mr. Zartman is silent on the risks of the Western Saharans accepting autonomy. Morocco pretty much broke every agreement it made with the Polisario in the decade after 1991. Why should the Polisario trust that Rabat would honor any autonomy agreement, even with constitutional and international guarantees?

I would urge Mr. Zartman to consider the cautionary tale of Eritrea. Eritrea in 1952 (in a situation with far too many eerie parallels to the Western Sahara to go into here) was forced into an autonomy arrangement within Ethiopia – but with seemingly ironclad assurances that Eritrea’s status could not be changed without UN approval. It took little more than a decade for Ethiopia to throw autonomy out the window and fully annex Eritrea, with hardly a whimper from the UN or the world community. And then it took another thirty plus years of unbelievable carnage and misery in the horn of Africa before Eritrean independence was achieved.

Agreeing to autonomy for the Polisario involves, it seems to me, an incredible leap of faith, and if oil one day is discovered in Western Saharan waters does anyone really think that Morocco would continue to allow the Western Saharans to run their own affairs?

Mr. Zartman quickly reaches his conclusion:

The challenge is to flesh out and implement the autonomy plan as a final solution, and inthat [sic] the US, France and Spain are not wrong in supporting the plan. Theofilopoulou does not tell us what to support, only that Algeria (and the PLS) need to be brought in. Into what? Autonomy is a good proposal and we should stick to it.

My impression (and I think Ms. Theofilopoulou’s too) is that no amount of fleshing out will be enough to convince the Polisario to discard their right to self-determination and accept the extreme solution of autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. They have international law on their side, and as mentioned above they have every reason to completely mistrust Morocco’s intentions. I don’t think it is farfetched to consider that if the Western Sahara loses its international status as a non-self-governing territory and becomes an “internal affair,” Morocco would have free rein to really bring us a “final solution,” as Mr. Zartman so delicately puts it. And if you feel I am being a bit alarmist here, I suggest you check out the latest Western Sahara reports from Freedom House, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch to get a picture of Morocco’s brutal totalitarian occupation.

I find it interesting that Mr. Zartman would have us “implement” Morocco’s autonomy plan, without any consideration of what the Western Saharans might think about it nor any mention that the Polisario has already categorically rejected the plan. This seems to be a plan to ram autonomy down the Western Saharans’ throats.

He feels that “the US, France and Spain are not wrong in supporting the plan.” I guess there IS nothing wrong with supporting it, but there is everything wrong with imposing it; and imposing it seems to be very much what Mr. Zartman has in mind. What else could he have in mind given that the Polisario has, I repeat, already rejected Morocco’s plan? Mr. Zartman has no problem with bringing Algeria and the Polisario into the process, but only to discuss autonomy. That smells of imposition to me.

And finally Mr. Zartman finishes with, “Autonomy is a good proposal and we should stick to it.” Good for whom, Mr. Zartman? And your argument that we should “stick to it” appears to be more of an argument to “stick it to” these poor desert people who deserve better.

What I find most disturbing about Mr. Zartman’s statement of support for Morocco’s autonomy plan is that he is a world-famous and prestigious expert on conflict resolution. No matter how nice autonomy might appear on paper, forced autonomy or autonomy outside the context of the Western Sahara’s right to self-determination (with independence as an option) is a recipe for disaster and conflict deterioration.

Mr. Zartman gets on Ms Theofilopoulou’s case about her not telling us what to support, so I will give my view. I can say wholeheartedly that I support a return to the referendum on independence as the basis for a settlement. The UN proposal to hold the referendum has been the only substantive thing the two parties have agreed on in over thirty years. Just because Morocco backed out of the referendum when it realized it might lose is no reason to scuttle this middle ground. The great powers must finally pressure Morocco to honor its agreements and abide by international law. The autonomy plan, that rewards Morocco’s aggression, sidesteps international law, and has little or no discernable support from the Polisario or among the Western Saharans, should be buried very deep in the sands of the Sahara.

Marc S. Ellenbogen & the Myopic Miasma of Moroccan Malice

In a recent UPI/Washington Times article titled Atlantic Eye: Morocco's Right to Sahara, Marc S. Ellenbogen reports on his recent visit to Morocco, heading a delegation from the Global Panel Foundation and the Prague Society for International Cooperation. The purpose of the trip was to hold “a series of briefings and brain-storming sessions … held under the auspices of THE ROYAL STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE (IRES)” on the future of Morocco. The visit was “at the invitation of the Hon. Hassan Abouyoub, Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to H.M. King Mohammed.” The article, which deals specifically with the Western Sahara situation, opens with the following poetic paragraph:

Washington D.C., April 26 (UPI) -- Ambassador Hassan Abouyoub, Jens-Hald Madsen and I stood on the portico of the magnificent Mirage Hotel in Marabata. The Atlantic waves hammered the steep cove below. Hassan and I took a smokers break, as Madsen noted the vast beauty in front of us.

From what follows in the article, one has to wonder what it was they were smoking while gazing down from the portico. Morocco is, after all, the world’s leading exporter of hashish. In any event, as the article moves from this idyllic scene to more serious matters of international law regarding the Western Sahara, Mr. Ellenbogen’s grasp of reality seems to completely deteriorate as he descends into a myopic miasma of Moroccan malice (hey, I get to wax poetic too).

Having reported recently on several cases of media madness on the Western Sahara, I’ll try to keep it brief by touching on the worst of what Mr. Ellenbogen has to say. I urge you, however, to follow the link and read the whole article because you will be tickled by the gravitas of it all. Here are some of the gems:

“It remains undisputed that Spain's restoration of Western Sahara to Morocco was legal.” Of course it is exactly the opposite of this that is much closer to being “undisputed.” The UN has ruled unambiguously that Spain’s transfer of the Western Sahara to Morocco (and Mauritania) was ILLEGAL under international law. And Morocco’s claim that it was a “restoration” was emphatically rejected. Here, Mr. Ellenbogen, are the links to the International Court of Justice ruling on the Western Sahara in 1975 and the more recent reaffirmation of that ruling by the UN’s legal counsel, Hans Corell, in 2002.

“The Moroccan proposal for extended autonomy submitted to the UN has been praised by experts - but rejected by both the Polisario and Algeria.” Sure SOME experts on the Western Sahara have supported Morocco’s proposal, but most of the experts that I am aware of are dismissive of any such Moroccan plan that denies the Western Saharans the right to self-determination.

“The supporters of the Sahrawi, who are mostly Algerians and European 60's throw-backs, have used the question of human rights as an instrument for forcing the issue of Moroccan Western Saharan secession and independence.” Mr. Ellenbogen is apparently unaware that some 40 countries also support the Sahrawi. I’m trying to figure out who exactly these “European 60’s throw-backs” are. I suspect they are those Europeans who believe fervently in decolonization and self-determination for colonial peoples. But then Mr. Ellenbogen doesn’t appear to support self-determination. As for those Sahrawi supporters using “the question of human rights as an instrument for forcing the issue…,” what’s wrong with that? But then again the author doesn't seem to like human rights either.

“There is no legal reason for Morocco to accept the secession of Moroccan Western Sahara - and UN formal resolutions do not demand this either.” To illustrate the inanity of this statement, I’d like to tell the story of a friend of mine who left her husband and filed for divorce; a couple days later her lawyer got back to her with the good news that, since she had lied about her age (15) when they got married in Vegas, they had never legally been married – so they didn’t need to get divorced. Just as you can’t legally divorce if you were never legally married, you can’t legally secede if you were never legally joined in the first place. That precisely is the case with the Western Sahara since not one country recognizes Morocco’s annexation.

“Morocco's approach, which respects the letter of the UN resolutions, puts an end to the logic for Moroccan Western Sahara secession.” How “Morocco’s approach…respects the letter of the UN resolutions” is a total mystery to me. Morocco’s autonomy proposal is an attempt to circumvent over thirty years of UN resolutions supporting Western Saharan self-determination. Sure the UN has urged the parties to start talking again, but nowhere does the UN support Morocco’s autonomy approach, which is clearly inconsistent with self-determination. Many UN resolutions, however, support the right of the Western Saharans to self-determination and independence if they so choose. And again to talk about putting an end to the logic for secession is absurd, since the parties were never married to begin with.

“The consensus at this Global Panel session is that the Moroccan Western Saharan question is best left to the principals involved. The United Nations, noted a ranking European diplomat, would best serve the needs of all concerned by removing itself from the entire question.” The Global Panel doesn’t seem to have a clue here that the Western Saharan question from 1975 until the late 80’s WAS “left to the principals involved” with minimal UN involvement. And it is not a coincidence that those were the years of war between the parties. It is disturbing that the best the panel can come up with is the return to a situation which would probably make war inevitable.

What is most interesting about this article is that Mr. Ellenbogen actually tries to make a legal case for Morocco’s autonomy plan. This is in stark contrast to the more-typical negative approach we have been seeing a lot of recently which says that one must support Moroccan sovereignty because the Polisario is a terrorist organization, or in cahoots with al-Qaeda, or communist, or in bed with Castro, or non-democratic, or whatever.

While Mr. Ellenbogen’s avoidance of the usual false negatives is I guess commendable, unfortunately his legal approach is just as bad. As I discuss above, his arguments that Spain’s transfer of the Western Sahara to Morocco was legal, that the Western Sahara quest for independence is illegal secession, that replacing self-determination with autonomy is legal, all these arguments are bogus. The UN and international law just don’t back him up on any of these things.

In the final analysis, this whole exercise by Mr. Ellenbogen strikes me as a thinly veiled attempt to kiss up to his gracious and generous Moroccan hosts by parroting their totally discredited legal opinions on the Western Sahara.

Polisario, Cuba, & Martian Invaders

Recently an outfit in Florida by the name of the Cuba Transition Project (CTP) of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies (University of Miami) has done us a tremendous favor by telling a Polisario tale so outlandish that it reveals the ugly face of Moroccan propaganda for all to see. The April article in this group’s online magazine, Focus on Cuba, titled Western Sahara: Where the Castro Regime Meets Al-Qaeda, would have us believe that, with the US pinned down in Iraq and Afghanistan, a Cuba/Polisario/Al-Qaeda axis has taken shape to “conceivably coordinate an offensive against U.S. interests and allied governments in the region, ” -- that region being North Africa. How the CTP manages to put together such an ominous story out of wind, sand, and camel dung is the story of this posting .

The CTP argument goes something like this (all quotes are from the article linked above):

The Polisario hates Morocco. As they put it, “In 1975, Moroccan King Hassan II led the peaceful "Green March" that reclaimed the territory that had historically been part of Morocco.” The “leftist” Polisario, “founded in 1973 as a national liberation movement opposed to Spanish colonial rule in North Africa,” fought a guerrilla war against this reclamation until a cease-fire in 1991. Since then the Polisario has been “confined to the far eastern fringe of Western Sahara.”

Cuba loves the Polisario and vice versa. “Since the 1970s, the Castro regime has been a fervent ally and backer of the POLISARIO Front.” On one hand, “upwards of 2,000 Sahrawis … have been trained in Cuban institutions and today occupy important political, social, administrative and professional positions in the POLISARIO political and military structure.” On the other, “The Cuban government maintains a “brigade” of physicians, advisors, and intelligence operatives within the POLISARIO zone.”

El-Qaeda hates Morocco, all moderate Islamic states, and the United States. Answering a call from Bin Laden henchman, Ayman al-Zawahiri “for 'new Fronts' in North Africa to 'crush the pillars of the Crusader alliance,'” al-Qaeda proxies such as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb have set up “mobile camps … in the Sahara hinterland for the training of new fighters."

Cuba hates the United States. This needs no explanation.

Out of this strange brew of loves and hates, the CTP, citing Moroccan government sources, concludes that the Polisario is coordinating and cooperating with al-Qaeda. They explain why this makes sense with, “Moroccan Justice Minister Mohamed Bouzoubaa interpreted POLISARIO’s rationale for an alliance with al-Qaeda ‘at all levels’ as a case of cultivating ‘an enemy of an enemy as a friend.’”

And finally the CTP pulls their whole theory together with the following concluding paragraph which I quote in its entirety due to its unparaphrasable eloquence and elegance:

If al-Qaeda and POLISARIO are indeed collaborating against Morocco and other moderate Arab states in North Africa, it is highly unlikely that the POLISARIO leadership would be doing so without the knowledge and acquiescence of Havana. Moreover, the "Cuban brigade" of advisors and intelligence operatives stationed within the POLISARIO zone may be directly or indirectly (via Cuban-trained Sahrawi) supporting al-Qaeda operations and training camps. At the very least, it would be unwise to assume that Cuba’s sophisticated intelligence apparatus is not providing valuable information and guidance to POLISARIO with a tacit consent to pass it on to an enemy (al-Qaeda) of a mutual enemy (the U.S.).

I find this article and indeed this whole exercise of connecting Cuba to al-Qaeda through the Polisario as repulsive for three basic reasons: 1) it doesn’t make any sense, 2) the facts don’t back it up, and 3) it is dishonest.

The basic commonsensical reason why Polisario/al-Qaeda collusion makes no sense is that al-Qaeda hates Algeria as much as or more than it hates Morocco, and Algeria is the Polisario’s best friend and benefactor. Algeria’s support is the sine qua non of Polisario survival. It is interesting that in the article, the CTP’s evidence for al-Qaeda activity in the Maghreb is not some attack in Morocco, but “a series of deadly terrorist attacks in Algeria since December 2006.” As the people over at Mambi Watch (in their wonderful 9-part series titled What’s a Polisario) quite rightly point out, why in the world would the Polisario get in bed with a group (al-Qaeda) dedicated to the overthrow of their main benefactor (Algeria)? And how do you think Algiers would react to news that the Polisario was consorting with al-Qaeda types?

Furthermore, I am not aware of any evidence of contact between al-Qaeda and the Polisario. The Polisario has been openly antagonistic to everything al-Qaeda believes in (and vice versa), and for the CTP to take the word of the Moroccan government on all this without any kind of evidence is laughable.

As far-fetched as al-Qaeda/Poliario cooperation is, a Cuba/al-Qaeda connection is even more so. Why would Cuba want to jeopardize its historical friendship with Algeria by having anything to do with al-Qaeda or its proxies? The CTP writes, “Given Fidel Castro's historic ties to Algeria's President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Cuban personnel likely enjoy secure access to the area via the Algerian border with Western Sahara.” Let me get this straight. Algeria is allowing Cubans to run around the Sahara to make common cause with Islamic jihadists who are trying to overthrow the Algerian government. A collaboration between the Polisario, Cuba, and Martian invaders would be more believable.

The most disturbing aspect of this article, though, is the thorough lack of any scholarly rigor. The basic failing is that the very serious allegation made here about a Cuba/Polisario/al-Qaeda axis taking shape is based totally on unsubstantiated material from the Moroccan government and its proxies (especially its registered agent in the US, the totally discredited R. M. Holley). Not one bit of evidence is offered to show that either Cuba or the Polisario have ever even met anyone from al-Qaeda. Needless to say, quotes by Moroccan ministers and agents about the Western Sahara hardly rate as evidence, given Morocco’s chronic mendacity regarding the territory .

Another dishonest technique used throughout the article is listing fine-sounding and credible sources and then misinterpreting those sources to fit the authors’ thesis. For example, in their first paragraph which gives historical background material on the Western Sahara, two sources are listed in the notes, one 2007 article from the Economist and a 1999 article from Time Magazine. Now these are decent enough articles from respected magazines. The only problem is that there is nothing in these sources that gives any credence to the CTP contention in the paragraph that the Western Sahara “had historically been part of Morocco.”

Similarly, in trying to make the case that al-Qaeda is setting up shop in the Western Sahara, the CTP informs us that “according to information obtained from an al-Qaeda recruiter arrested in Spain in February, mobile camps have been established in the Sahara hinterland for the training of new fighters.” This startling information is attributed in the notes to: Simon Tisdall, "Al-Qaeda's new front in Africa," Mail & Guardian, 19 February 2007. Checking out Tisdall’s article, we discover that the mobile camps referred to by the al-Qaeda recruiter were located in the “scrub country” of the Sahel, and nowhere near the Western Sahara. This kind of playing around with sources is, to say the least, journalistically dishonest.

After a careful reading and analysis of the article, one can only conclude that the whole Cuba/Polisario/al-Qaeda scare is a sham and a hoax.

The larger story behind this disgraceful article is the well-funded and by-now-well-traveled Moroccan propaganda trail that leads from Rabat through PR, lobbying, and media outfits in Washington D.C. such as Edelman PR, the Moroccan-American Center for Policy, and the Washington Times into the anti-Castro world of Representatives Mario Diaz-Balart, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, law firm Tew-Cardenas LLP, and think tanks such as the Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies (ICCAS) in Miami. For anyone interested in the Cuban connection and why this bunch of anti-Castro zealots has such a “thing” about the Polisario Front, I refer you to the above-mentioned series of brilliant articles (What’s a Polisario, Parts 1-9) in Mambi Watch.

The Washington Times’ Onedownsmanship on the Western Sahara

It seems that just when you start thinking that media coverage of the Western Sahara crisis can’t get any worse, an article comes along that sets a new standard for dishonesty.

A few weeks ago, a stunningly blatant piece of Moroccan propaganda from the pen of former US ambassador to Morocco, Frederick Vreeland, appeared as an editorial in the New York Times. Vreeland’s piece in support of Morocco’s stillborn autonomy plan certainly raised eyebrows among those who know a thing or two about the issue. It took only a few days for the Times to discover that a company of which Vreeland is chairman had Moroccan government contracts and that he was certainly not some disinterested analyst of the situation. Vreeland was quickly and emphatically discredited.

That fiasco was just starting to recede from memory when last Friday (April 13) the Washington Times (WT), in a rather incredible case of onedownsmanship, came out with an editorial titled “A Solution in the Western Sahara.” I think it is fair to say that this bit of editorial nonsense, also in support of Morocco’s autonomy plan, breaks new ground for Moroccan propaganda.

Truly the WT comes out with stuff that would make even Frederick Vreeland blush. Take the opening sentence: “On Wednesday, the Moroccan government presented the United Nations with a framework for autonomy for the Western Sahara region, taking the first step, which the United Nations has called for repeatedly, toward a political dialogue with its longtime adversary, the Polisario Front.” What is it, let us think, that the UN has been calling for repeatedly. Well if I recollect the UN has for over thirty years repeatedly called for a referendum on independence in the Western Sahara. There has been plenty of political dialogue already between the parties in the 1990’s before, during, and after the 1991 cease-fire agreement, and Morocco has already broken all the agreements resulting from this dialogue. And while the UN recently has indeed been calling for a renewal of talks, it has been careful not to endorse the autonomy plan which is clearly not consistent with international law regarding self-determination. It is just somewhat hard to comprehend how the autonomy proposal is “a first step…toward a political dialogue” when the other party, the Polisario Front, has already categorically refused to join the dialogue and so far the UN refuses to endorse the idea.

It gets even worse. Two paragraphs down from this opening volley we learn that “The terms of the 1991 cease-fire agreement were not fully met until August 2005, when the Polisario, under pressure from the international community -- particularly the United Nations and the United States -- finally released the last 404 Moroccan prisoners of war.” I’m still trying to figure out what this means. Wasn’t the MAIN “term” of the cease-fire agreement the holding of a referendum on independence? Since the last I looked Morocco unilaterally cancelled the referendum process and refuses to discuss it further, it is hard to understand how all the terms of the cease-fire agreement were met in August 2005.

And then we learn, “The heinous conditions the POWs faced, including barbaric torture and forced labor, was a human face on the political struggle, and revealed the true nature of the Polisario Front, which had long portrayed itself as victim.” While the extent of torture and forced labor at the hands of the Polisario is a matter of continuing discussion and debate, there is no doubt about the extent of Moroccan torture and forced labor, not to mention disappearances and murder. Don’t take my word for it. Check out the results of Morocco’s own Truth and Reconciliation Commission and any number of Human rights Watch and Amnesty International reports. The true nature of Morocco stares us in the face, and the Washington Times wants to turn the Western Saharans over to these monsters.

Unbelievably, the editorial continues downhill: “Allowing the Sahrawi people to vote on a referendum seems like a simple enough solution, but the Polisario's insistence on restricting the voter lists locked that process into more than six years of effectively fruitless discussion.” Pinning the blame for the scuttling of the referendum on the Polisario just doesn’t stand up to any kind of honest scrutiny. Certainly, the Polisario would have preferred the narrowest possible voter list based on the old Spanish census, which would have unquestionably led to an overwhelming vote for independence; but they compromised several times on this in the hope that it would lead to a vote. The Polisario’s eventual acceptance of the Baker II plan which would have allowed most of the illegal Moroccan settlers (who outnumber the Western Saharans some two or three to one) to vote doesn’t sound to me like “insistence on restricting the voter list.” In fact, it was Morocco’s insistence on EXPANDING the voter list to include many Moroccans with no history of living in the territory that killed the process. And, of course, Morocco’s true colors were revealed when they rejected Baker II. No matter how broad a voter list was forced down the throats of the Polisario, Morocco was just not going to allow a referendum on independence.

The WT continues: “The Moroccan initiative is the first, and to date the only, proposed framework for a political solution to come from either side, and from it the two sides can craft a final agreement.” First of all, we must not forget that back in the 1990s Morocco and the Polisario already agreed on a “framework for a political solution” with the cease-fire agreement and then the Houston Accords. And then the Times conveniently ignores the fact that one day before Morocco brought its autonomy plan to the UN, the Polisario released its own plan -- for holding a referendum and with a special relationship with Morocco should the vote be for independence. Morocco’s initiative is hardly the first and only proposed framework for a political solution.

And the WT goes on: “It preserves Moroccan sovereignty, but gives the Western Sahara sufficient autonomy to become effectively self-governing.” Must I repeat for the umpteenth time that no country on earth, nor the UN, recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, and the International Court of Justice has ruled that Morocco doesn’t and never did have sovereignty. According to international law “sufficient autonomy” just doesn’t cut it.

And on: “The autonomous region would, for instance, have a local legislature that would, in turn, elect an executive, who would be invested by the king.” Yes, “invested by the king,” who was never elected by anyone and can unilaterally dismiss his own Moroccan legislature and cabinet. Some autonomy that would be.

And on: “Resolving this issue is also necessary for the entire Maghreb region to move forward economically.” Oh so true, even though it is not immediately apparent why forcing autonomy down the throats of the Western Saharans is a better way to resolve the issue than to say hold a referendum and allow an independent Western Sahara if they so choose.

And on: “Inasmuch as poverty and dire economic circumstances fuel the recruitment of terrorists, two incidents this week -- one an attack in Algiers claimed by a group that now calls itself al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the other a standoff in Casablanca that ended after three suicide bombers blew themselves up and a fourth was killed by police -- testify to the importance of helping the region.” Again, it seems to me that this is more an argument for holding a referendum on independence than on forcing autonomy on the Western Saharans. Inasmuch as poverty and dire economic circumstances fuel the recruitment of terrorists, giving the Western Sahara its independence and relieving Morocco of the huge financial burden of a highly unpopular military occupation, would go a long way towards improving Morocco’s dire economic circumstances.

The WT begins its conclusion: “The Polisario now needs to reciprocate the Moroccan government's move to the negotiating table.” The Polisario needs to do nothing of the sort. For over thirty years the UN and the world community have been assuring the Western Saharans that they have the right to self-determination (which includes independence) through a referendum. Why should the Polisario engage with Morocco on a plan that defies the UN and international law, and terminates a just struggle on the aggressor’s terms? The WT somehow condemns the Polisario for “continu[ing] to demand a referendum” as though that is what is perpetuating the misery in the region. Hey, come on now – the UN demands a referendum, James Baker wanted a referendum, most of the world is for a referendum, even John Bolton was pro-referendum. Why not just force Morocco to hold a referendum? The WT similarly condemns the Polisario for its threats of “renewed violence.” It seems to me that once the centerpiece of the cease-fire agreement, the holding of a referendum on independence, was taken off the table by Morocco, Rabat was asking for a return to violence. If Rabat tries to unilaterally impose annexation or autonomy without a referendum that includes independence that would be tantamount to a declaration of war.

And finally the editorial ends: “A firm line is required. The United States can make clear to the Polisario that if it cares for the Sahrawi people, it needs to begin serious negotiations.” NO NO NO NO. Negotiations? There is no longer anything left to negotiate here. The US must make clear to Rabat that it just cannot continue defying the UN and international law, and that it must hold a referendum.