Frederick Vreeland, High Solar Rollers, and the Looting of the Western Sahara

While researching my last post on Samuel J. Spector and Hurst Hannum, I reread Ambassador Frederick Vreeland’s March 3, 2007, New York Times op-ed in support of Morocco’s autonomy proposal. Once again, Vreeland’s arguments in favor of autonomy were firmly slapped down by Professor Hannum in a letter to the editor the next day, and, in addition, three weeks later, the Times issued a correction stating that the “Op-Ed article should have more fully disclosed the background of the author,” as he was “also the chairman of a solar-energy company that has had contracts with the Moroccan government.”

Not having heard anything out of Vreeland for quite a while, I got to wondering what he was up to – especially since solar-energy has been a hot topic of late. Apparently, he’s been up to quite a bit.

His Marrakech-based solar-power company, Noor Web, is “a supplier of photovoltaic systems and related energy services in rural and remote areas of Morocco,” according to the International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank Group, which in 2002 had received a project financing application from Noor Web. Vreeland founded the company in 1996 with financial backing from E & CO, an energy investment spin-off from the Rockefeller Foundation and has served as chairman ever since. As of mid-2002 when the IFC released its project report, ownership included: “Shell Overseas Investment (39%); Al Tayyar – a middle east investment fund-- (21%); Marocaine Industrielle Financière Agricole (18%); Mr. Frederick Vreeland –an individual-- (10%); E&Co (9%), and others (3%).” This is one very well-connected company with very deep pockets. Shell Overseas Investment is a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell; Al Tayyar is an Abu Dhabi-based renewable energy investment fund founded by Prince Moulay Hicham of Morocco, cousin of King Mohammed VI; Vreeland brings in his heavy-duty US government connections; and again E & CO has the Rockefeller connection.

Until recently, Noor Web appears to have concentrated on small-scale solar projects in the mountainous province of Taroudant south of the company’s offices in Marrakech. From an interview with Noor Web executives, by 2001 they were serving a mere 2,200 customers and acquiring 200 new households a month.

Increasingly, it seems that Noor Web’s small-scale orientation is changing. The last couple years have seen seismic changes in Morocco’s solar-power landscape. Most notably, two gargantuan solar initiatives have emerged -- one from the Moroccan government and the other a European/Mediterranean group.

Back in July 2008, Western Sahara Resource Watch (WSRW) alerted us to the launch by Morocco’s Office Nacional de l’Electricité (ONE) of an invitation for the expression of interest and prequalification for three solar plant projects (using “electricity generation technology … based on Photovoltaic (PV) panels”), one based in Morocco (Ouarzazate) and the other two in occupied Western Sahara (Dakhla and Boujdour).
According to the tender, dubbed the Courak Iniative (appearing also as Chourouk), the awarded company would “construct, operate and own the plant for a period of 20 years,” during which ONE would buy all the electricity generated. WSRW strongly criticized the inclusion of Dakhla and Boujdour in the prequalification tender:

The planned investment could provide the necessary infrastructure to further back up Moroccan industry and illegal settlers in the neighbouring and occupied country Western Sahara. The UN has previously asked Morocco to terminate the occupation of Western Sahara, but now Morocco offers the world electricity companies a 20 year contract in the occupied territory…. Morocco has in the offering presented Dakhla and Boujdour of being within "the Kingdom of Morocco", despite the fact that no state in the world recognises Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Keeping on top of the issue, WSRW in February 2009 listed the names of the 21 groups that were prequalified to participate in the tender, urged them to withdraw from the tender, and informed them that any awarded company that started supplying electricity in occupied territory would be “subject to a public campaign.” Within the context of this article, the name on the list that jumps out is number 16, Solar Ecopower/Taqa/Noorweb /Solon.

Noor Web’s prequalified group offers up impressive credentials in the energy and solar sectors to complement its already impressive ownership pedigree. Solar Ecopower is a German company that provides “investor services for large scale solar PV farms/plants, solar PV system integration, and procurement services and direct product sales.” Abu Dhabi-based Taqa describes itself as “a global leader in the energy sector…. that is fully integrated with operations from wellhead to wall socket.” It has majority ownership by the government of Abu Dhabi and minority shares traded on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange. Taqa has a huge and long-established foothold in Morocco with a 30-year contract to operate the Jorf Lasfar coal-fired plant 130 kilometres southwest of Casablanca which on average supplies 50% of the country’s electricity demand. Solon is a publicly-traded Berlin-based manufacturer of photovoltaic solar systems with an expertise in power-plant construction.

Morocco’s solar plans became clearer in November 2009 when Rabat officially launched a $9 billion dollar solar energy project, expected to meet 38% of the country’s energy needs by 2020. While the 2008 prequalification tender mentioned Ouarzazate, Boujdour, and Dakhla as the sites for solar plants, the new plan identified again Ouarzazate and Boujdour, but replaced Dakhla with Ain Bni Mathar, Foum Al Oued and Sebkhat Tah. Of the new lineup, Ouarzazate and Ain Bni Mathar are in Morocco and Boujdour and Foum Al Oued are in occupied Western Sahara. Sebkhat Tah appears to straddle the border. At the end of February 2010, Morocco officially opened up for bids on construction of the Ouarzazate facility, and the commercial operation date for Ouarzazate was projected for March 2015.

At the same time as Morocco was ratcheting up its solar plans, a pan-Mediterranean group, the DESERTEC Foundation, was putting together a massive 400 billion euro solar energy plan to meet potentially over 50% of the electricity needs of the EUMENA region (Europe, the Middle East, North Africa) by 2050. A major part of this vision involves harnessing the solar potential, and to a lesser degree the wind, of the Sahara and exporting North African energy to Europe. The DESERTEC Concept has been around since 2003, when it was developed by the German Club of Rome and a network of experts called Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Cooperation (TREC). The project started to gather steam in 2008 with the birth of the DESERTEC Foundation to coordinate the activities of the DESERTEC Networks, the creation of the Mediterranean Solar Plan by the Union for the Mediterranean, and the launching of the DESERTEC Industrial Initiative (Dii Gmbh). To get a graphic depiction of DESERTEC’S vision for solar (and wind) power development in North Africa and the prominence of the Western Sahara in that vision, I urge you to link here to the DESERTEC Foundation’s website.

Given the importance of the Western Sahara in both DESERTEC’s scheme and Rabat’s solar plans, there has been much speculation about whether DESERTEC might place one of its test plants in the occupied territory. In an April 23, 2010, article in the UK Guardian, a DESERTEC spokesperson stated that while Morocco was a “a natural choice for the first Desertec pilot plant as the country is already connected to Spain via a sub sea electricity cable,” they would not build in the Western Sahara for “reputational reasons.” A German NGO, the Society for Threatened People, had earlier condemned Morocco’s plans to build a solar plant in Boujdour and had urged DESERTEC to reveal where they planned to build their first pilot project in Morocco. These words from DESERTEC are certainly encouraging. Nevertheless, I wonder how long DESERTEC can maintain this principled stance as it becomes more and more evident that the occupied status of the Western Sahara and chilly relations between Morocco and Algeria might jeopardize the feasibility of the whole project

It would be fair to say that Frederick Vreeland very much finds himself in the right place at the right time. He has been on the ground in Morocco since 1996 doing solar, and the solar market appears to be on the verge of exploding. Morocco’s tender for Ouarzazate is ongoing, but of course building a solar power plant there is not a problem since it would be in Morocco. Where the solar picture gets far thornier is when and if Morocco opens up for bids on Boujdour and Foum Al Oued in the Western Sahara. Given that almost all groups looking into the matter see the solar potential of the Western Sahara as far greater than that of Morocco, it will be interesting to see how Rabat proceeds. Any companies bidding on those contracts in the occupied zone would undoubtedly find themselves the target of widespread international condemnation along the lines of Western Sahara Resource Watch’s campaign against oil exploration companies that chose to explore in and off Moroccan-occupied territory. Would Shell, for instance, with the largest ownership stake in Noor Web, risk an international campaign against it by getting involved in the Western Sahara?

One aspect of the Morocco and Western Sahara solar issue that hadn’t occurred to me until I started looking into all this is the heavy involvement of Germany. Germany has historically shown little interest in the Western Sahara. This might be about to change. It seems that wherever I looked in researching this post, some German connection appeared. Two of Noor Web’s partner companies in the group that was pre-qualified for the solar business, Solar Ecopower and Solon, are German companies. The DESERTEC Industrial Initiative (Dii Gmbh) is a German company and the DESERTEC Concept very much has its roots in Germany. Furthermore, when Morocco announced its 9 billion dollar solar plan, one report noted: “Among potential partners, Morocco has already secured agreement with the World Bank, the European Commission, and Germany. During a visit to Berlin in January, the Chief Executive of the Moroccan Agency for Solar Energy Mustapha Bakkoury held talks with officials from Germany’s development bank KfW about investing in the pioneering project.” Somehow energy issues have a way of leading Germany and German leaders into the arms of strange bedfellows. Look, for instance, at former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s canoodling with Vladimir Putin while in office and his relationship with various Russian oil interests, especially involving the Nord Stream pipeline project, after stepping down. An increased German government perception that it is in its national interest as well as the interest of some of its companies to side with Morocco could lead to a higher profile supporting Rabat, which would be a highly unwelcome development.

What does this all mean for the Western Sahara? With the potential for solar energy perhaps rivaling or even exceeding that of oil, Morocco, its agents, and its sympathizers will almost certainly let out all stops in attempting to convince the international community that the Western Sahara must be recognized as part of Morocco. This has actually already begun, as the U.S. media over the past year has been bombarded by an unprecedented volume of pro-Moroccan articles urging the U.S. government, the world community, and the UN to recognize and accept Moroccan rule over the non-self-governing territory. Contrary to international law, Morocco is already looting the fish and phosphates of the Western Sahara. The potential for solar generation in the Sahara is so huge that it is hard to imagine that Rabat won’t go all out to also steal the sun.

And what can we expect from Frederick Vreeland? I rather suspect that given his conflict-of-interest and transparency issues and his well-known propensity for supporting Rabat’s expansionist agenda, he will keep a very low profile on the PR front and will concentrate instead on making money and lobbying his buddies in the U.S. government to support Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Besides I assume he is more than happy to let his fellow-ex-ambassadors-to-Morocco, Michael Ussery and Ed Gabriel, do the dirty work for him. Once again his company, Noor Web, has already prequalified, as part of Ecopower/Taqa/Noorweb/Solon, for upcoming Moroccan solar projects, and he has shown interest in proceeding to the next level; he was recently quoted by a group called North Africa Advisers as saying, “I am interested in the Morocco government’s $9 billion solar energy project announced under the auspices of King Mohammed VI in early November 2009.” And should Rabat go ahead with its plans to loot the sun of the Sahara, Frederick Vreeland will undoubtedly do what he has always done, which is to ignore international law and the rights of the Western Saharans in pursuit of his own self-interest.

Samuel J. Spector’s Egregious Malfeasance on the Western Sahara

Morocco and Western Sahara

As a consultant to James Baker in drafting what became known as the "Baker Plan" for Western Sahara, I must disagree with Ambassador Frederick Vreeland's pro-Moroccan argument for an autonomous Western Sahara in "A young king's wise proposal," (Views. March 3).

Nowhere is it mentioned that Morocco's claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara was specifically rejected by the International Court of Justice in a 1975 advisory opinion, which reaffirmed the Saharans' right to decolonization and self-determination. The 1975 Moroccan march to "reclaim" Western Sahara cited by Vreeland was government-instigated and widely condemned.

Every resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council in recent years has reaffirmed the right of the people of Western Sahara to determine their own future, but Morocco has consistently rejected any proposal that would allow the fate of Western Sahara to be determined through a free referendum in the territory.

King Mohammed VI's proposal for autonomy may well be the most sensible solution for Western Sahara, and it should be considered seriously by the Sahwari government-in-exile and people. However, Morocco has no authority to impose a solution unilaterally, and the UN Security Council should not issue a diktat against the wishes of the people of Western Sahara.

Hurst Hannum, Hong Kong

written in response to Frederick Vreeland’s Op-ed article in the New York Times, Will Freedom Bloom in the Desert? (March 3, 2007)

In the summer of 2009, an article titled Western Sahara and the Self-Determination Debate (Middle East Quarterly (MEQ), Summer 2009, PP. 33-43) by someone I’d never heard of, a certain Samuel J. Spector, crossed my computer screen. The article is a somewhat-interesting attempt to make an international law case for implementing Morocco’s autonomy proposal, which - given international law’s clear rejection of Morocco imposing anything on the territory - is just not the normal approach taken by pro-autonomy people. While the approach might have been novel, my recollection is that I found the article’s legal case for autonomy extremely weak and promptly dragged it to the recycle bin.

Last November, I ran across Mr. Spector once again in the comments section following a pro-autonomy article by our old friend Ed Gabriel that appeared on Globalpost.com. Ambassador Gabriel’s article was his rather typical pro-Morocco nonsense, and when I chimed in to disagree with him, first Robert Holley from the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) and then Samuel J. Spector added their comments in support of Gabriel. Spector’s piece was pretty much a condensed version of his MEQ article.

I am now posting a blog on Spector’s article almost a year after it came out because, as much as I would like to believe that tossing things in the recycle bin makes them and their authors disappear, Mr. Spector just won’t go away. Actually, with his recent participation in a rabidly pro-Moroccan Middle East Institute “policymakers roundtable” on the Western Sahara (March 11), he appears to be becoming a darling of the pro-autonomy set. His support of Robert Holley and Ed Gabriel noted above and the fact that MACP saw fit to issue a laudatory press release on the MEI event a day after it took place only confirm my suspicions.

At first glance, Mr. Spector’s education (Georgetown Law School), employment (the prestigious law firm Weil Gotschal and Manges), and the impressive number of heavy-duty footnotes in his article seem to indicate that he is a reasonably serious fellow. Likewise, the fact that an earlier version of his essay won second prize in the Middle East Quarterly's 2008 Albert J. Wood Student Writing Contest is further indication that there are serious people out there who also feel he is a reasonably serious fellow.

So after my quick dismissal of his article last summer, I felt that I better go back and reread it in case I had missed something. Unfortunately, several rereadings only confirm my original conclusion that this is far from being a serious paper.

Samuel Spector’s basic argument is that, with the winding down of the colonial era, “self-determination must … be reframed in the present context as a continuum of rights affording the affected populations a range of democratic entitlements and humanitarian protections within existing sovereign states.” By taking the possibility of independence out of self-determination, he argues that “an arrangement rooted in a realistic vision of autonomous self-government that would incorporate reasonable guarantees of cultural expression, political freedoms, and human rights for the inhabitants of Western Sahara might then be given a chance to take shape.” In other words, his argument is that evolving international law supports adopting autonomy as the sole basis for solving the Western Sahara debacle.

Mr. Spector’s article is unconvincing on several levels. The historical overview and, in particular, his analysis of the referendum years, is particularly weak. In trying to illustrate how “desolate in resources” the Western Sahara is, for instance, he states, “There is no arable land and while the region boasts phosphate deposits, much of its economic potential comes from fishing off its 700-mile coastline.” Given that the Western Sahara would be one of the largest exporters in the world of phosphates -- a vital, rapidly diminishing and currently very-high-priced resource – I would say that his command of the economics of the situation is tenuous. And he chooses to not even mention the possibility of oil and potential for solar power. In addition, his admission that throughout Western Sahara’s history “various North African Islamic dynasties … exerted some control” but that “nevertheless, the region remained largely nomadic and free from central authority” punches holes in several of his later arguments for ignoring the International Court of Justice opinion and accepting Moroccan sovereignty over the territory. All told, he pontificates mightily about things he clearly knows little about.

It is, however, his legal arguments that strike me as the worst part of the article. If there is one particular aspect of Spector’s discussion of self-determination and the Western Sahara that demands comment – and indeed condemnation - it is his quoting and referencing Hurst Hannum, Professor of International Law at the Fletcher School of Tufts University and our leading self-determination guru, in support of his thesis. My copy of Professor Hannum’s Autonomy, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights, the classic college text on self-determination, sits on my bookshelf alongside Tony Hodges’ Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War as the most referenced books for my work on the Western Sahara. I greatly admire Professor Hannum’s work and use him often in support of MY fervent conviction that the Western Saharans have a clear right under international law to determine their own fate, be it as an independent state or part of Morocco. Needless to say, Spector’s use of Professor Hannum to support the opposite view – namely that forcing the Western Sahara to become an autonomous part of Morooco is OK under international law – certainly caught my eye. In addition, Spector’s invocation of Hannum struck me as particularly bizarre given Professor Hannum’s 2007 letter to the editor in the New York times – quoted in its entirety at the top of this post – clearly stating his position that “Morocco has no authority to impose a solution unilaterally, and the UN Security Council should not issue a diktat against the wishes of the people of Western Sahara.”

The fatal flaw in Mr. Spector’s argument here is very much linked to his total misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Hurst Hannum. Actually the extent to which he tortures Hannum’s ideas to fit into his autonomist agenda is truly mind-boggling. Five of his footnotes refer to Hannum’s article “Self-Determination in the Twenty-First Century” in a book co-edited by Hannum, Negotiating Self-Determination (2006). Professor Hannum encapsulates his thesis in his article as follows:

It is the suggestion of this chapter that, following several years of indecision, the international community has moved toward a new definition of self-determination. This new definition continues to exclude the possibility of unilateral, nonconsensual secession, but it has become infused with broadly defined human, minority, and indigenous rights that may signal a new usefulness for the concept of self-determination in the decades to come.

The vital element of this “new definition” that totally escapes Spector is that it is specifically for situations of secession. While Hannum acknowledges that we are in “largely a post-colonial era” in which “calls for self-determination, possibly including independence, are even becoming more muted in the classic decolonization cases of Kashmir and Western Sahara,” nowhere in his article does he suggest that we or the world community should do away with the right to independence inherent in de-colonial self-determination. But that is precisely what Spector tries to do. He takes Hannum’s new definition of secessionist self-determination and applies it to the non-secessionist de-colonial situation of the Western Sahara. And then having taken Hannum out of context, he uses Hannum’s new definition to back up his legal argument for denying the possibility of independence to the Western Sahara and instead imposing autonomy within Morocco.

And for anyone who has any doubts about Spector’s thoroughly unethical abuse of Hannum, I refer you again to Professor Hannum’s letter to the editor at the top of this post which was written a year AFTER the Hannum article referenced by Spector.

In the final analysis, Samuel Spector’s attempt - in the name of redefining self-determination for the 21st century - to reframe the Western Sahara situation solely within the context of autonomy without the possibility of independence is preposterous. His understanding of both Western Saharan history and self-determination law leave a lot to be desired. And his shoddy scholarship is just plain unethical. No wonder that he is becoming the darling of the pro-Morocco lobby.

RSF & Cartographic Genocide in the Western Sahara

For a number of years now, Reporters sans Frontieres (Reporters without Borders) (RSF) has chosen to completely contradict its high ideals by writing the Western Sahara off its on-line maps and including the territory within Morocco. If you visit RSF.com, click on any of the countries on the drop-down menu under Middle East & North Africa (MENA), and scroll down to their MENA map you will find a Morocco that stretches from Gibraltar to Mauritania. The only hint of Western Sahara’s existence can be found if you click on Morocco itself to reveal a red-highlighted greater Morocco with a barely visible line depicting the border with the Western Sahara.
Weirdly, if you click on any of the other MENA countries, you will find the same MENA map but without the thin line in Morocco.

This is not a new problem. Alle at Western Sahara Info brought RSF’s inexplicable treatment of the Western Sahara to our attention in 2007, and way back in 2003 this tidbit about RSF’s mapping shenanigans appeared on the ARSO website:

Following a protest campaign, the "North Africa to Iran" office of Reporters without Borders (RSF - Reporters sans frontières) decided to withdraw a map of Morocco which included Western Sahara. This map which did not conform to international law figured in RSF publications relating to the campaign for Ali Lmrabet. The President of the Spanish office, said that she realised the map used expressed the expansionist claims of Morocco, but wanted to make clear that RSF did not campaign politically about it, as they were trying to save the life of the Moroccan journalist !!!

Before looking closer at RSF’s mapping problem, a quick review of the Western Sahara’s status is in order. Legally, the territory is categorized by the United Nations as a non-self-governing territory. Claims to sovereignty over the territory by Morocco and Mauritania were rejected by the International Court of Justice in 1975. Diplomatically, no country officially recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara, even though a couple dozen mostly Arab League countries give lip service to Moroccan sovereignty. Close to 80 countries have at some point recognized the sovereignty of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), but current recognitions number around 40 if you believe that de-recognitions are acceptable. Another element in the diplomatic equation is the full membership of the SADR in the African Union. Militarily, Morocco has de facto control of around 75-80% of the land with the SADR controlling the rest.

On all three counts RSF’s map is totally inaccurate. International law and diplomatic recognition clearly reject any inclusion of the Western Sahara in Morocco; and any depiction of de facto occupation must show the division of the territory between Morocco and the SADR.

RSF’s complete offing of the Western Sahara raises serious issues.

RSF is no Moroccan-American Center for Policy, which clearly is paid by Morocco to lie about the Western Sahara. It is a well-respected human rights NGO that cares about international law and does consistently superb work in support of beleaguered journalists around the world. Furthermore, it has been very forceful in its condemnation of Moroccan press freedom abuses. Why then would they choose to ignore international law and use a map that is rejected by just about everybody except Morocco and its agents?

Then there is the question of consistency and double-standards. RSF on its MENA map unambiguously gives Rabat its greater Morocco, but denies Tel Aviv its greater Israel (The West Bank is clearly not included in Israel). Why has RSF applied different mapping standards to two similar cases of occupation? Alle, once again, has commented on this.

Whenever I run into something as strange as this RSF thing, I can’t help but wonder about motives. Why in the world would a group as basically outstanding as RSF resort to cartographic genocide by mapping the Western Sahara out of existence. Does it have to do with the fact that they are headquartered in France, which supports without reservation Morocco’s illegal occupation? Is there any French political pressure at play, or maybe corporate financial pressure? Is there anyone on their Board that particularly loves Morocco or hates the Western Sahara? Not being privy to RSF internal politics, I am at a loss to understand their persistent refusal to do the right thing on this issue. All I know is that RSF has been made aware of their mapping problem for years now (and I have recently contacted both their offices in Paris and Washington DC about it), and they stubbornly resist changing their maps.

If anyone can shed any light on RSF’s behavior, we here at Western Sahara Endgame would love to hear from you. But until they decide to do the right thing and remove the Western Sahara from Morocco on their maps, I urge you to email your objections to:

Soazig Dollet, North Africa & Middle-East Desk, Reporters without Borders: moyen-orient@rsf.org

Clothilde Le Coz, Director Reporters without Borders USA: clc@rsf.org

Jean-François Julliard, Secretary General RSF: rsf@rsf.org

I went through, it seems, hundred of maps of Morocco and the Western Sahara in putting together this post – many of them quite original if not altogether accurate. In line with their iconoclastic image, Lonely Planet gets the award for Most Bizarre Map. Apparently having missed the part of the ICJ ruling about terra nullius, they clearly separate the two entities, refraining from naming the southern entity, and writing “Western Sahara Desert” overlapping the borderline. For those of you who wonder why so many Moroccans are perpetually constipated over the Western Sahara issue, there’s the Greater Moroccan Map. They just can’t get over being smaller than Algeria and not being able to steal fish from the Senegal River like they do from the Western Saharan waters (actually I was surprised not to find Washington DC on the Greater Moroccan Map given the US’s perpetual genuflecting before the King on the Western Sahara issue; but then I guess I could say the same thing about Israel). The award for Most Conflicted Mapmaker goes to the National Geographic Society. Between their On-Line Atlas , On-Line World Map , and Africa Political Map, they map the area in at least three different ways using a mind-boggling array of borderline, color, and nomenclature gimmicks. Finally, the Most Accurate Map prize goes to MINURSO, the UN Mission in the Western Sahara. I detect a crazy amount of time being spent by a lot of organizations trying to figure out how to map the area. Why not show it as it is and use the MINURSO map that clearly separates Morocco and the Western Sahara and marks the zones of occupation?

Commander Zartman's Last Stand on the Western Sahara

Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, & Options for Effective US Engagement in North Africa has been sitting on my desk for a few months now. This policy paper released in March by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and the Conflict Management Program (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins is worth a look, if only because of the all-star cast that has chosen to affix their names to such a thoroughly flawed study. Panel Members on the North Africa Policy Paper Project behind the report include such luminaries as Secretary Madeleine Albright, General Wesley Clark, and Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat, and notable academics Chester Crocker from Georgetown, John Entelis from Fordham, and I. William Zartman from Johns Hopkins (Co-Chair). While one would think that this star power might guarantee a certain level of honesty and rigor in the study, Why the Maghreb Matters is a joke, and a very bad one at that.

Initially, my intention was to write a lengthy post about all that is wrong with this study, but alas as so often happens several individuals and groups beat me to it with excellent reviews. So rather than bore you with a rehash, I’ll link you to the two that I found most illuminating: The Potomac-SAIS report on North Africa: Paid Analysis, Partisan Fear Mongering, Bad Policy by Jacob Mundy and Why the Facts Matter: A Response by the Saharawi Journalists and Writers Union (UPES) to “Why the Maghreb Matters." Their revelations on the blatant dishonesty of the Potomac-SAIS work are truly damning.

While these two reviews are pretty comprehensive in their debunking of the Potomac-SAIS study, there is one part of the study that epitomizes its utter intellectual bankruptcy and which, as far as I can tell, nobody has commented on -- that is their incursion into comparative self-determination. On page 14 they site several examples of what they consider to be similar self-determination cases to that of the Western Sahara which back up and support their autonomy proposal. An examination of these examples reveals that they either have nothing at all to do with the Western Sahara or else serve as far better support for the Polisario point of view. Here is the section in question, with the highlights mine:

The people of the region must be given an opportunity for self-determination, which can take the form of autonomy (as occurred from Zanzibar to Aceh). That acceptance can be expressed in a referendum confirming the option offered. The process could begin with a formal endorsement by the interested Western states— US, UK, France, Spain—of the principle of autonomy, with a limited period of time for final negotiations to take place over its details. At the end of the upcoming fifth round of UN-sponsored negotiations between the parties, whatever its outcome, the US could pursue an effort among Security Council members to recognize autonomous status within Morocco and invite others to follow suit, much as was done for a similar option for Aceh, Cameroon, Biafra, and for a reverse option for Bosnia and for Kosovo.

Zanzibar

Zanzibar? Their choice of Zanzibar is baffling. A British protectorate from 1890, Zanzibar was given full independence from Britain in 1963 after a 1961 election that formed the first post-protectorate government. In 1964, after a bloody revolution brought a leftist regime to power under Amani Karume, the Zanzibar government agreed to unite with newly-independent Tanganyika to form The United Republic or Tanzania under which Zanzibar had substantial autonomy. What is so strange about this choice of examples is that, since Zanzibar was granted independence BEFORE agreeing to join up with Tanganyika and accept autonomy, this is a far better argument for granting independence to the Western Sahara. Then if it turns out that the Saharawis really love the Moroccan crown as much as Rabat claims, they can always join up later with Morocco. Moroccahara has a good ring to it.

Aceh

This is an interesting choice. Aceh’s claims to self-determination stem primarily from the territory’s marginal integration into the Netherlands East Indies. Jakarta’s brutal military rule and exploitation of the abundant natural resources of the territory have further complicated the matter. Nevertheless, Aceh was never designated a non-self-governing territory by the UN, and I am not aware of any country that does not recognize Aceh as an integral part of Indonesia. The study’s attempt to use the example of Aceh to justify their autonomy proposal for Western Sahara is perplexing on several counts. First, under international law the cases are totally different. Second, autonomy for Aceh -- from the granting of “special territory” status in 1959 with some autonomy in religious, educational and cultural matters to the autonomy granted after the 2004 tsunami – is very much a work in progress and there are real questions about the sustainability of the current status. Last but not least, the use of Aceh begs the question of why the authors chose to ignore the case of East Timor, which has far closer parallels to the Western Sahara than does Aceh. In case you hadn’t noticed, the non-self-governing East Timor got its referendum in 1999 and gained independence in 2002. Fears that the loss of East Timor would lead to an unraveling of Indonesia, a communist and/or fundamentalist takeover in Jakarta, and the end of the free world as we know it were apparently unfounded.

Bosnia

I admit my ignorance here of what this “reverse option” is. Why Bosnia is even mentioned is a mystery to me in that it is not autonomous and furthermore has a rather dubious independence given the threats of the Republika Srpska to secede.

Kosovo

One would think that Potomac-SAIS would have avoided mention of Kosovo like the plague. After all, it was the CANCELLATION of Kosovar autonomy by the Serbs in 1989 that in no small measure set in motion the events that led to Kosovo’s independence. If anything the Kosovo case is a cautionary tale about the pitfalls of autonomy and thus I would think greatly strengthens the Polisario case.

Cameroon

I’m at a bit of a loss identifying exactly which part of Cameroonian history is being held up here to support the autonomy proposal. Is it the decision of the UN in 1961 to deny the British Cameroon real self-determination (in violation of the UN Charter) and to instead offer them a choice between inclusion in Nigeria or the Republic of Cameroon (the former French Cameroon)? Is it the decision of President Ahidjo in 1972 to unilaterally cancel the autonomy that the federated state of West Cameroon (the part of British Cameroon that chose to join the Republic of Cameroon) enjoyed after 1961? Or is it the clamoring of the anglophone Cameroonians for at least the last 20 years for a return of the autonomy they enjoyed until 1972? Whatever the case, none of this long sad history of denial of self-determination and cancellation of autonomy appears to offer much support for the Moroccan autonomy plan. Au contraire, autonomy in Cameroon comes across as a pretty dubious proposition. And actually the more I think about the original UN decision in 1961 to deny the British Cameroonians a vote on independence but to allow a choice between inclusion in Nigeria and Cameroon, the more I wonder whether the Potomac-SAIS people might be on to something. If they really think that independence is the end of the world, why not offer the Western Saharans a choice between inclusion in say Algeria, Mauritania, Spain, and Morocco. But then again I guess we all know who would come in last here.

Biafra

Biafra is the classic case of secession. As much as Morocco likes to think of the Western Sahara as secession pure and simple, there is very little international support for this notion. The UN certainly doesn’t consider it secession, and the total lack of any recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the territory tells me that the international community is similarly skeptical.

As an aside, I can’t help but add that this bizarre collection of examples dredged up in support of Morocco’s autonomy proposal bears the unmistakable marks of Commander I. W. Zartman’s compromised scholarship on the Western Sahara. Commander Zartman, once again, is the co-chair of this whole Potomac-SAIS fiasco. Take a look, for instance, at these talking points from his presentation at a 2005 forum on self-determination and the Sahara hosted by the NGO Search for Common Ground:

What is the case of Western Sahara like and not like (in comparison to “similar” cases)?
It is not like East Timor -- Western Sahara was colonized 40 years ago and not 400.
It is not like Palestine -- It is not a separate nation.
It is not like Sudan -- Its habitants are not “separate” people (e.g. its habitants are of the same religion as Morocco)
It is not like Namibia -- It is not a trusteeship territory with the UN as an administrator.
It is like Catalonia (Spain) -- It is self-autonomous within a larger state.
It is like Aden (Yemen)
It is like Zanzibar (Tanzania)
Compared to “similar” cases, Western Sahara has a tiny population and little resources.

Western Sahara colonized 40 years ago? Not like East Timor? Like Catalonia? Didn’t Aden get INDEPENDENCE as the People's Republic of South Yemen in 1967, long before it united with North Yemen in 1990? I’ve already talked about Zanzibar. Do any of his examples make any sense?

The recommendations of the Potomac-SAIS report are based on bad history, bad facts, bad analysis, and, as I argue here, bad examples. With this level of honesty and scholarship from Commander Zartman and his cronies, it is no wonder the Obama administration is considering dumping Morocco and its autonomy plan.

The Bodansky File (Continued)

In a recent analysis, Youssef Bodansky, former Director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and a visiting scholar at Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS), noted that the greatest threat to stability in the Maghreb and Western Mediterranean was what he described as “the rejuvenation of the terrorism campaign” of the Polisario Front. The escalation by the Polisario comes in the midst of the latest United Nations effort to finally resolve the Western Sahara conflict.

-- Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP) press release (January 11,2008)

Unaware that Polisario had a terrorism campaign to rejuvenate, I wrote a short post a few months ago titled The Bodansky File in which I mention my unsuccessful attempt to find the “recent analysis” on Polisario terrorism referred to by MACP. I am pleased to report that recently I stumbled across that analysis on an obscure blog called Med-Atlantic.

Made up of six posts from October 2007 to May 2008 by a poster identified as Medperson, Med-Atlantic -- subtitled “On the importance of the Mediterranean Basin as a strategic environment, with its impact on North Atlantic Security” -- is a passionately pro-Morocco and savagely anti-Algeria rant heavy on Polisario bashing. It even comes down hard on the U.S. for not supporting Morocco forcefully enough. The basic thrust of the site is that Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara must be asserted in order to counter what the author sees as Algerian expansionism that threatens the stability of the Maghreb. Medperson apparently has no problem with Moroccan expansionism.

The study referred to in the MACP press release is printed in its entirety in the body of a December 2007 post titled Algeria Pushes POLISARIO Toward a New War “More Dangerous than Al Qaida”. Medperson prefaces that study with the following:

Med-Atlantic received a leaked report from the Global Information System (GIS), an intelligence service used by the US Defense Department and other key Western governments, which details Algeria's plans for POLISARIO. We're running it in full here: POLISARIO Congress Reflects the Major Threat to Maghreb Stability as Algeria Enters a Power Struggle, With Itself and the West By Yossef Bodansky, Senior Editor, GIS.

Mr. Bodansky gets right to the point in his first two paragraphs:

The great threat to stability in the Maghreb and the Western Mediterranean is not the ascent and spread of the Islamist-jihadist trend — which is extremely dangerous in the mid- to long-term — but is shaping up to be the rejuvenation of the terrorism campaign by the Frente POLISARIO (Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y de Rio de Oro).

POLISARIO is currently holding its special 12th congress in Tifariti, Moroccan Western Sahara (MWS), east of the berm. Because of the regional strategic dynamics, the calls for, and threats of, the resumption of the “armed struggle” against Morocco emanating from this POLISARIO congress may prove a greater destabilizing factor for the entire Maghreb than even the most recent jihadist bombing in Algiers.

The rest of Bodansky’s report is spent trying to back up these rather ominous warnings. But before I take a look at his ideas I would just like to highlight a couple things in these first two paragraphs that I feel betray his mindset.

There is for starters the matter of his insistence on calling the territory the “Moroccan Western Sahara.” Most of the world calls the former Spanish Sahara colony the “Western Sahara,” but Morocco prefers the “Moroccan Sahara.” Why Bodansky prefers to use the made-up “Moroccan Western Sahara” – and the even sillier “MWS” – is a mystery to me. And his placing Tifariti within the Moroccan Western Sahara is just bizarre, since it is in the part of the territory controlled by the Polisario and thus firmly within the SADR Western Sahara (SADRWS).

And then there is his subtle bait and switch. Having warned us of “the rejuvenation of the terrorism campaign by the Frente POLISARIO” in the first paragraph, by the second this has morphed into a resumption of armed struggle. In fact, the question of Polisario terrorism is never again mentioned in the study. It’s hard to tell whether his branding Polisario a terrorist organization was just a slip of the pen or whether he just forgot to offer any proof. In any event, it is all too typical of MACP’s modus operandi that it should trumpet the terrorist threat of Polisario based on a study that offers absolutely zero evidence of such terrorism.

Now on to Bodansky’s ideas. What apparently initially got him all riled up was the Polisario party congress held in Tifariti in December 2007 where, he states, “the POLISARIO Frente resolved to rearm and prepare for a new war which would be launched by 2009 if the diplomatic process could not deliver POLISARIO’s demands for full independence.” Bodansky’s take on the Tifariti congress is just wrong. Nowhere at the congress did Polisario threaten war if its “demands for full independence” were not met. Polisario has unambiguously made it clear that self-determination through a referendum with independence as an option is what they seek, and that they will abide by whatever the people decide, be it independence, autonomy, or inclusion in Morocco.

From this erroneous premise, Bodansky proceeds to make his case for quashing Polisario and supporting Moroccan hegemony. He makes three basic arguments: 1) that the Western Saharan people overwhelmingly support a return to Morocco, 2) that Africa doesn’t need another failed ministate, and 3) that Polisario’s threat to return to arms is directly related to the Algerian succession crisis.

The Western Saharan people overwhelmingly support a return to Morocco

Here is what Bodansky has to say about the desires of the Western Saharans:

More than 15 years after the latest ceasefire agreement in MWS, the entire population — both in Morocco and in the POLISARIO-run camps — has demonstrated a strong commitment to a return to stability, normalcy, and chance at the betterment of their own lives. The population of MWS has indicated, through elections and other indicators, a measurable determination to remain an integral part of the Moroccan rejuvenation and development. The MWS population has been passing this message for several years to the POLSARIO leadership via their expatriate kin in Western Europe. In contrast, the refugee population in the POLISARIO camps, mainly in the Tindouf area in Algeria, is exhausted from the closure, hardship, lack of prospects. The people see no hope for themselves in an Algeria torn by civil war and afflicted by economic misery….

Simply put, the people of MWS realized that their own aspirations can be best achieved when they are part of Morocco….

The Moroccan elections of early September 2007 provided an uncontroversial proof of this transformation of the people of MWS….the voter turnout in the MWS was extremely heavy….This constitutes a clear demonstration that the population in MWS considers itself Moroccan, is convinced that it has vital stakes in the political process in Rabat, and is determined to have its say there….Thus, the Moroccan parliamentary elections in MWS proved that the local population considers itself an integral part of a single, unified Morocco.

What is one to make of this kind of writing that opinionates with absolute and categorical certainty about things that demonstrably are not true? About thirty seconds of research is enough to realize that what he says is “clear” is totally unclear, what he says in “uncontroversial” is totally controversial. He chooses to not even mention the anti-Moroccan demonstrations and riots of the last few years that clearly debunk his theory of total Western Saharan support for Moroccan hegemony. He chooses to ignore the fact that the majority of people currently living in the occupied territory are subsidized Moroccan migrants and colonists with no legal ties to the Western Sahara under international law and thus no say on the territory's future. He chooses not to mention any of the numerous studies by respected NGOs that chronicle the brutality of Moroccan police rule and increasing assertions of Western Saharan nationalism and anti-Moroccan sentiment. His generalizations about the yearnings of the refugees in Tindouf don’t stand up to any kind of scrutiny. And in the final analysis, Bodansky’s claim that the entire population desires a life under Moroccan rule is rendered totally farcical by Rabat’s refusal to allow a referendum under any circumstances.

We Don’t Need Another Failed Mini-State

Bodansky writes:

Meanwhile, the international community has become increasingly alarmed by failed ministates, such as Timor-Leste, and unchecked secessionism. Even the most ardent supporters of the “Sahrawi people” in the West now doubt the viability of a POLISARIO-run state. The West sees no need for another failed state and bastion of criminality, living off the smuggling routes between west-central Africa and Western Europe. All expert studies have demonstrated that a POLISARIO-run state cannot sustain any other type of economy on its own; industrial and resource development are impossible without reliance on the infrastructure and human resources of Morocco while POLISARIO advocates the complete delinking of MWS from Morocco. Hence, particularly after the POLISARIO’s intransigence in the UN-run Manhasset, New York, talks in early August 2007, international support for Morocco’s autonomy plan — with all its possible imperfections — has started to grow.

While the issue of failed states is indeed serious, Bodansky’s attempt to convince us that the Western Sahara would be such a state is hardly convincing. His contention that “Even the most ardent supporters of the 'Sahrawi people' in the West now doubt the viability of a POLISARIO-run state” is just silly. I would love to know who these “most ardent supporters” are. The ardent supporters I am aware of tend to feel that an independent Western Sahara would do just fine given the small population and the large natural resource reserve base of the territory. Similarly, his sweeping declaration that “All expert studies have demonstrated that a POLISARIO-run state cannot sustain any … type of economy on its own” other than one based on criminality and smuggling is ludicrous. To say “all expert studies” is I would say a bit presumptuous; I have trouble thinking of even one.

POLISARIO’s threat to return to arms is directly related to the Algerian succession crisis

And here Bodansky really hits his stride:

However, what makes POLISARIO’s threat to resume the armed struggle so ominous — beyond the continued military build-up of POLISARIO in its Algerian sanctuaries — is its impact on the Algerian succession crisis. Pres. Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s health has deteriorated recently. With no heir apparent, inner struggles are intensifying within the Algerian Government. Most important is the succession struggle between the “army élite” and the “energy lobby”, both comprised of most senior officials and their cronies. Furthermore, each of these groups is further divided into pro-Russia, pro-France, and pro-US sub-groupings. Therefore, all decisions are made as a result of power-maneuvers between at least six “clans” which confront each other and win through transient and narrow-issue alliances.

The “army elite” and some in the “energy lobby” believe that crisis and war are the quickest way — a shortcut — to the post-Bouteflika throne. In recent years, Bouteflika preferred to stay neutral. When he had to take a side, he tilted with the “energy lobby”, which generated US and Western support. However, in recent months, Pres. Bouteflika has clearly tilted toward, and even openly sided with, the “army élite”. While Bouteflika made his move because he believes the military élite is better suited to sustain him in power and follow his policies, he will have to “pay” for the military support by heightening the regional tension even if it leads to war with Morocco.

This is the nitty gritty of Bodansky’s argument – that Algerian perfidy is behind all of the Polisario saber-rattling or more specifically that Algerian President Bouteflika is purposely trying to destabilize the whole region to sustain himself in power. I haven’t a clue whether Bodansky’s analysis of the Algerian succession makes any sense at all. I do find it ironic, though, that what he accuses Algeria of doing is precisely what Morocco has been doing throughout this conflict. There is a wide acceptance, especially within the U.S. government, of the notion that the Alaouite dynasty might fall if it “lost” the Western Sahara. Mohammed VI and his father Hassan II have for over 30 years rejected self-determination for the Western Sahara in defiance of the UN and international law and kept the region in a state of perpetual instability in order to guarantee THEIR succession. All I know is that Morocco, by completely refusing to abide by the terms of the cease-fire agreement of 1991 and by refusing to now even discuss real self-determination has forced the Western Saharans into a corner. If the Western Saharans once again take up arms, Morocco will have no one to blame but itself. Bodansky’s attempt to place the blame on Algeria is preposterous.

Yossef Bodansky’s study is an elaborate fabrication masquerading as informed security analysis. He either doesn’t have a clue what he is talking about or else is intentionally falsifying the current situation in the Western Sahara for Moroccan gain. His pompous attempts to sound authoritative about things that are clearly not true are damning. His attempt to brand Polisario a terrorist organization without any substantiation is just plain unethical.

There is something altogether very sleazy about Bodansky's whole involvement with the Western Saharan issue. To begin with, there’s MACP’s reference to his study, which in itself makes the report very suspect. Then there’s the supposed leaking of the secret study to Medperson at Med-Atlantic; the stylistic similarities between Medperson’s posts and Bodansky’s study lead me to believe that Medperson IS Bodansky and he is leaking his own report.

And then there is the whole relationship I allude to in The Bodansky File between Bodansky, Marc. S. Ellenbogen, and Hassan Abouyoub, Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to King Mohamed VI of Morocco in Prague at the Global Panel Foundation and Prague Society. Rabat through Abouyoub is clearly using this well-connected behind-the-scenes networking cabal in Prague to give a stamp of legitimacy to its cockamamie ideas about the Western Sahara. Ellenbogen through his syndicated column Atlantic Eye provides an entrée into Reverend Moon’s media empire (UPI, Washington Times, Middle East Times, etc.); Bodansky supplies a well-established following from his best-selling books on terrorism and a direct conduit into the U.S. government from his employment with Congress. The drivel that came out of this group’s field trip to Morocco last year (see Marc S. Ellenbogen & the Myopic Miasma of Moroccan Malice) only confirms the extent to which this group is compromised.

In conclusion, I return to Bodansky’s warning that a resumption of Polisario’s armed struggle would be more destabilizing for the Maghreb than Al Qaeda. I happen to agree with that. A return to war in the Western Sahara would be a catastrophe for all involved. However, as I see it, this is a rationale for the world community to once and for all force Morocco to hold a referendum on independence (with autonomy as an option if you like), so this whole issue can finally be put to rest. Trying to force Moroccan sovereignty onto the Western Saharans and to legitimize Rabat’s expansionism, as Bodansky would have it, would only create the very situation he says he is trying to prevent.

Why Was Morocco's Autonomy Initiative Devised?

The Initiative was launched to overcome the deadlock in United Nations’ mediated negotiations between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of Algeria and their proxy the Polisario Front. As the work of several United Nations’ Secretaries-General and their Personal Envoys to the region have failed to reach a mutually-acceptable solution, the Kingdom of Morocco drew up the Initiative for negotiated autonomy for the Sahara to reach a lasting political solution to the conflict.

-- Freedom for All website (Tanya Warburg, Director)

This view that Morocco’s autonomy initiative for the Western Sahara should be supported because it is a commendable and reasonable compromise to once and for all overcome “the deadlock in United Nations’ mediated negotiations” has been getting a lot of play time recently by the pro-Rabat forces. The view is unacceptable and should be soundly rejected because its basic premise -- that the “deadlock is the result of a “fail[ure] to reach a mutually-acceptable solution -- is just not true. The reality of the matter is that the current deadlock is based totally on the failure of Morocco to abide by the “mutually-acceptable solution” that was reached by Rabat and the Polisario in 1988, approved in its final form by the Security Council (S/22464, “Settlement Plan”) in 1991, and refined further by the Houston Accords signed by both parties in 1997. The autonomy initiative is a joke because it ignores the reality that it is Morocco that has created the current deadlock by refusing to implement the far-reaching solution that was agreed to by all the parties to the conflict (Morocco, Polisario, Algeria, and the UN) two decades ago.

With the 20^th Anniversary of that historic agreement coming up in August it is I think an appropriate time to look back at the Settlement Plan. I will quote liberally from the International Crisis Group’s (ICG) June 2007 report, Western Sahara: Out of the Impasse, which gives a concise, accurate, and well-written analysis of the referendum years (all quotes below are from that report with page numbers noted).

In August 1988, both Polisario and Morocco declared that they accepted a UN proposal (based on an earlier OAU proposal) for a ceasefire, exchange of prisoners, repatriation of refugees and the withdrawal of Moroccan forces from the territory, to be followed by a referendum on self-determination, with the choice being between independence and integration into Morocco. A final version of this proposal, known as the Settlement Plan, was approved by the Security Council in 1991. (p.1-2)

I was following the issue at the UN in Geneva in the early 1990’s and remember the euphoria accompanying the Settlement Plan. The Polisario and Hassan II had met for the first time; a mutually-acceptable plan to resolve the crisis had become a reality; MINURSO was in place to register voters; and the referendum was expected within a year. The euphoria, however, proved to be short lived. With the ink on the Settlement Plan still wet, Morocco embarked on a pattern of obstruction that would eventually result in the scuttling of the Plan a decade later. The ICG continues:

Morocco and the Polisario Front had formally agreed in 1988 that the referendum should be based on the electorate as defined by the 1974 census of the territory….But in April 1991 King Hassan of Morocco insisted that the voter rolls be expanded well beyond what has previously been agreed and include people who had long been settled in Morocco. (p. 2)

Had King Hassan allowed MINURSO to do its work per the Settlement Agreement, the referendum would have taken place in 1992 or 1993 and the crisis would have been over. Instead he chose to pursue a strategy of trying to pad the electoral roles with pro-Rabat Moroccans “in order to maximize Morocco’s chances of winning the referendum.” (p. 2) The Polisario of course resisted this attempt to rewrite and circumvent the agreement, and by mid-decade the referendum process had made little progress. Then along came James Baker III to try to save the day.

When the process seemed in danger of coming to a stop, the personal envoy of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III, managed to rescue it through intensive diplomacy. In a series of meetings which he held with Morocco, Polisario and Algeria in April 1997, all three parties reaffirmed their commitment to the 1991 Settlement Plan. Further rounds in London and Lisbon paved the way for a final meeting in Houston on 14-16 September 1997. There, agreement was reached by the parties on all the issues blocking implementation of the Settlement Plan, including the key issue of voter identification. (p. 2)

With a new agreement in hand, MINURSO was able to resume the registration of voters. “In January 2000, MINURSO, after years of meticulous work, at last arrived at what it regarded as a fair determination of the valid electorate for the proposed referendum, namely a total electorate of 86,386.” (p. 2) At that point, once again the end of the crisis was in sight and the referendum could have been held in short order. But Rabat had other ideas. MINURSO was “promptly faced with no fewer than 131,038 appeals against its decisions…, the vast majority of these Moroccan-sponsored applicants.” (p. 2) The Settlement Plan was dead.

Reluctant to dismiss these appeals and accordingly faced with the prospect of, in effect, having to begin the voter identification process all over again, the UN tacitly dropped the 1991 Settlement Plan…. (p. 2)

Again, my reason for returning to this history of the Settlement Plan is to counter the view of the pro-Rabat people that autonomy is a fine compromise justified by the elusiveness of a “mutually-acceptable solution.” As you should see from the above, the parties mutually accepted two major solutions in 1988 and 1997, and Morocco obstructed, undermined, and ultimately trashed both. Again, the ICG is eloquent on this:

There is a clear asymmetry in the behaviour of the main parties. The Polisario Front signed up to the 1991 Settlement Plan and, having made a number of concessions on the voter identification issue and on certain secondary matters, was clearly prepared to abide by its outcome…. It cannot be said of Polisario that it went back on any of its undertakings. But Morocco repeatedly did so with impunity. Whenever matters came to a head, Morocco demonstrated that it did not accept UN arbitration of important issues if this arbitration went – or threatened to go – against it. And Morocco also, and above all, repeatedly demonstrated that it accepted the principle of self-determination only if the result of its exercise in a referendum could be guaranteed in advance to be in Morocco’s favour. (p. 5)

Why was the autonomy initiative devised? Tanya Warburg’s view that it has to do with Morocco’s desire to find a “mutually-acceptable solution” to break the deadlock is pure nonsense. Once again, such a solution was reached years ago and Morocco showed itself to be a thoroughly dishonest and duplicitous negotiating partner. The autonomy initiative is nothing more than a cynical attempt by Morocco to leverage its friendship with the U.S. and France to prevent self-determination in the ex-colony and to gain formal recognition of its illegal annexation. I say “cynical” because history has proven that Morocco and its apologists such as Tanya Warburg couldn’t care less about the well-being of the Western Saharans. If they did they wouldn’t be so insistent on denying them the right to vote on their future.

Freedom for All (except the Western Saharans)

Over at One Hump or Two, Nick Brooks of Sand & Dust recently alerted us to the appearance of another outrageous pro-autonomy website titled Freedom for All:

I thought the Together Foundation had slipped gently away after it became obvious that it was a put-up job by Moroccan spooks. It seems to have been replaced by this:

http://www.freedom-for-all.org/index.php

They seem to have hired someone with better web skills and a more comprehensive command of the English language for FFA. However, it's still the same unsubtle pro-Rabat bilge.

As if it wasn't obvious enough who's behind this, there's a watermark-style background that shows a greater Morocco, with a Moroccan flag squatting over the western Mediterranean.

Same old craaap, just a bit slicker.

I checked out the Freedom for All site, and Nick is quite right that this is a far slicker production than the Together Foundation. Since the site does not list officers, board members, or any names for that matter, I thought I’d try to find out who was behind this blatant propaganda effort.

A quick google of their phone number in London (+44 (0) 7711 67 1896) shows that Freedom for All shares a number with a public relations and marketing firm also in London named Davis Warburg Associates, named after the partners of the enterprise Helen Davis and Tanya Warburg.

Googling “Helen Davis” and Morocco revealed nothing of interest; “Tanya Warburg” and Morocco, however, pulls up around 25 results informing us that Tanya Warburg is the director of Freedom for All. She sprang onto the Western Sahara scene in October 2006 when she testified in support of Morocco’s autonomy proposal and on behalf of Freedom for All at the 4^th Committee in New York.

After this testimony, she kept a low profile until she registered her website in April 2007 under the name of her web designer, Paul Freedman of Red Sphere Media (thank you Laroussi for posting this on One Hump or Two).

Given that PR firms (most notably Edelman) are the main conduits of Moroccan propaganda and misinformation regarding the Western Sahara in the U.S., the fact that Freedom for All is run by a partner in a U.K. PR firm raises all kinds of red flags.

A quick call to London confirmed that Tanya Warburg is indeed director of Freedom for All. To my rather pointed questions, she denied receiving any money at all from Morocco and said that her work for Freedom for All was strictly a hobby. With no evidence to the contrary, I will take her at her word on this.

Of course, if she is not being paid by Morocco that raises the question of what then explains the grotesque pile of misinformation, factual errors, errors of omission, and flawed analysis that makes up her site.