Monday, January 23, 2006

Why Autonomy for the Western Sahara is a Bad Idea

A Reuters story on January 22 reads: “Morocco plans to submit a proposal in April to grant autonomy to Western Sahara, home to Africa's longest-running territorial dispute, a Moroccan source close to the situation said on Friday.” At first glance, I can think of three reasons why such a proposal should not be taken seriously.

1) Under international law, Morocco does not have the right to “grant autonomy.”
2) The Polisario and most of the Sahrawi oppose autonomy, would never agree to it, and would violently resist it.
3) Granting autonomy to the Western Sahara would be for Morocco only a short stop on the road to full annexation and subjugation of the territory.

Autonomy is Contrary to International Law

The UN designation of the Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory plus the International Court of Justice ruling that Morocco never exercised territorial sovereignty over the area unambiguously give the Western Sahara the right of self-determination. Morocco quite simply does not have the right to “grant autonomy.” Autonomy would require either:

-- a referendum, which Morocco refuses to hold, or
-- a negotiated settlement, which the Polisario would refuse to consider, or
-- a UN ruling, which after over 30 years of championing self-determination is highly unlikely, or
-- a unilateral move by Morocco in defiance of the UN, which would solve nothing given that Morocco has already been defying the UN since 1975.

Forced Autonomy Would be Violently Resisted

If autonomy were forced down their throats, the Polisario and the Sahrawi would fight and the last thing anyone wants is more instability in North Africa. While Morocco has for years been propagating the fantasy that the Polisario represents only a small percentage of the Sahrawi people and that the majority of the Sahrawi would prefer to return to the bosom of the motherland, the reality is quite different. Thousands of international observers who have been through the refugee camps can attest to the strong support for the Polisario among the refugee camp population. And the increasingly large demonstrations in the territories by Sahrawi displaying the SADR flag suggest widespread support for independence. It is the Moroccan rejection of the Baker II Plan, however, that is most revealing. The referendum spelled out in Baker II would allow most of the Moroccan settlers in the territories to vote and the indigenous Sahrawi would be outnumbered by some three or four to one. That Rabat would reject a plan that is seemingly so stacked in its favor tells me that they still think they might lose. The point here is that any forced autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty would almost certainly be met by substantial resistance and violence from a large portion of the Sahrawi population.

Autonomy is annexation in disguise

I see no possibility that Morocco could or would keep their word about granting real autonomy to the Western Sahara. For over thirty years the Moroccan Monarchy, military, and elite have been enriching themselves by plundering the natural endowments of the Western Sahara – in particular the phosphates and the fish -- and would be extremely reluctant to relinquish control of their cash cow. Given the pervasive corruption in Morocco, the kingdom’s social, economic, and political backwardness, and its long history of lying, duplicity, and reneging on agreements and promises regarding the Western Sahara, it is inconceivable that any kind of autonomy would be respected. Autonomy would very rapidly turn into annexation.

Most of those who have jumped onto the autonomy bandwagon seem to think that granting autonomy to the Western Sahara will somehow miraculously lead to peace and tranquility in the Maghreb. It is hard to see, however, how refusing to hold the referendum, taking the option of independence off the table, and then arrogantly proposing to "grant" autonomy can be anything other than a recipe for disaster. After almost 15 years since the cease-fire, by rejecting all electoral and negotiated solutions and playing the autonomy card Morocco will, in effect, be declaring war on the Polisario. It didn't have to come to this.

Saturday, January 14, 2006

Claude Moniquet (continued)

Another useful addition to the rapidly growing list of scathing critiques of Claude Moniquet and his report on the Polisario is an article by Khatry Beirouk that appeared on 1 January 2006 titled What Lies Behind the ESISC Report. Mr. Beirouk maintains the informative Western Sahara On-line website at www.wsahara.net and has for many years been a tireless advocate for the Sahrawi cause.

Mr. Beirouk’s article concentrates on placing Moniquet and his report within the context of the broader Moroccan campaign to discredit the Polisario. I have argued in an earlier posting that the consistent refusal of the Security Council – and in particular the US and France – to pressure Morocco to abide by UN resolutions calling for a referendum combined with the Moroccan refusal since at least 2003 to even consider a referendum or the option of independence has lead to an end to UN primacy on the Western Sahara issue. The likelihood that Washington and the other interested capitals will play a much larger role in the endgame than in earlier phases of the conflict means that public opinion will also play a much larger role. Morocco’s endgame strategy clearly is to step up its misinformation campaign to demonize the Polisario in order to finesse the world community into side-stepping the UN and finally giving in to Morocco’s illegal land-grab. Thus, Mr. Beirouk is totally correct when he says, “Never have the media been so influential in determining the course of the events on the conflict in Western Sahara as during the current Saharaui uprising.”

Mr. Beirouk identifies several pillars of the Moroccan campaign. International NGO’s have for over thirty years been in the forefront of the fight for a referendum. To counter their almost universal condemnation of Morocco, he writes that Rabat “was in search for a humanitarian organization denigrating Polisario to use as reference, and found it on France-Libertés.” To counter the United Nations long history of support for Western Saharan self-determination, Rabat found Erik Jensen, who served as head of MINURSO from 1994 to 1998, who was “willing to sell his soul to the devil” by abandoning self-determination and espousing autonomy within Morocco. Finally, to divert attention from the increasing Islamist and terrorist drift (born of failed social and political policies) among Moroccans both in Morocco and in Europe, Rabat found an expert on Islamism and terrorism, Claude Moniquet. Mr Beirouk writes, “Now, the hand-kissing government will be relying on the ESISC's 'expertise' on international security to spread its falsehoods.”

And from my perspective in the United States I can add a fourth pillar. The United States Congress has been very sympathetic to the Polisario for many years due to the effective lobbying of their ambassador-at-large in the US, Moulud Said, the efforts of the US-Western Sahara Foundation (under the umbrella of the Defense Forum Foundation) to educate members of Congress and their aides on the issues and to fund trips to the refugee camps, and the active involvement of, in particular, two pro-Polisario legislators, Congressman Joe Pitts and Congressman Donald Payne. Recently, however, Rabat has aggressively targeted Congress and found several American legislators willing to do their dirty work. A group of rabidly anti-Castro Cuban-American Congressman in Florida (Representatives Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Lincoln Diaz-Balart, and Mario Diaz-Balart) have proved to be particularly receptive to tall tales of the exploitation of Sahrawi students in Cuba and have been more than willing to parrot Moroccan propaganda. Morocco’s biggest coup was, undoubtedly, convincing former prisoner-of-war Senator John McCain to champion the cause, in a well-publicized press conference, of the remaining Moroccan POW’s in Tindouf without a peep about the Sahrawi prisoners held, disappeared, or slaughtered by Morocco.

In addition to placing Claude Moniquet and his report within the broader context of Moroccan propaganda, Mr. Beirouk also traces the strange and perplexing transformation of Moniquet from anti-Moroccan terrorist guru to pro-Moroccan Polisario basher. He shows how from 2003 until late 2005, Moniquet publicly warned of the increasing dangers of Moroccan terrorism both in Morocco and in Europe and criticized the Moroccan government for its “official denial of the risks of terrorism” and “the lack of social and democratic reforms in Morocco.” The bitter reaction in Morocco to Mr. Moniquet’s analysis comes across loud and clear in the following description by Mr. Beirouk:

On June 2005, Claude Moniquet becomes the focus, and the target of the Moroccan press. He is slammed and denigrated by the Makhzen propaganda machine. He's called the "self-appointed terrorism expert". The weekly Maroc-Hebdo, spearheading the campaign, wrote that "such misinformation cannot and should not go without a reaction", in response to his testimony before the US Congress. The press wondered about his "real motivations".


And then the ESISC Polisario report comes out in November 2005, Mr. Moniquet appears in Morocco and “the government controlled media present[s] a new member of the ESISC, in the person of Mohamed Ifkiren, a Moroccan, as vice-president of the Center, and Claude Moniquet has morphed into the darling of the Moroccan elite. Mr. Beirouk writes, “How could the ESISC so easily succumb, by whatever means, to the Makhzen's trap when other European Centers with good reputation did not?” The sudden about face and the utter venality and dishonesty of the ESISC report really do make you wonder.

Khatry Beirouk has done us all a great service by contextualizing Claude Moniquet’s behavior.

Tuesday, January 10, 2006

What is Claude Moniquet's Problem?

In November of last year the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC), a Brussels-based think tank and research center specializing in terrorism and security issues, presented a lengthy (81 page) report titled The Polisario Front: Credible Negotiations Partner or After-effect of the Cold War and Obstacle to a Political Solution in Western Sahara. From their website we learn that the ESISC was founded in 2002 by Claude Moniquet, a well-known journalist and expert on counter-terrorism, and that the Center’s areas of expertise include: “terrorisme et contre-terrorisme, renseignement, conflits de basse intensité, conflits ethniques et religieux, antisémitisme et racisme, islamisme et les autres formes d’extrémisme politique ou religieux, crime organisé et corruption, sécurité économique.” A cursory websearch reveals, furthermore, that the Center has built up a substantial reputation on matters related to terrorism in its four short years of existence, and their founder and president, Mr. Moniquet, is indeed a well-respected expert in his field who has written books, consulted and written for CNN among others, and has testified at Congressional hearings in the US. This impeccable pedigree combined with “Methodological Observations” at the beginning of the report informing the reader of the comprehensive, scholarly, and systematic research that goes into their reports prepared me for a weighty, illuminating, and definitive analysis of the Polisario Front.

Unfortunately, what we get from the ESISC is inexplicably disappointing. Contrary to all expectations, what emerges in the pages of the report is an embarrassingly amateurish, poorly researched, factually inaccurate, and badly written hatchet job. The most disturbing aspect of the report is not so much its poor quality (which is not exceptional if you keep up on the transparent propaganda that has been coming out of Rabat for over thirty years on the Western Sahara), but the clear malicious intent of Claude Moniquet and his crew. The lack of scholarly rigor, the numerous factual errors and the omission of widely accepted facts, the use of unsubstantiated rumor and innuendo, and ultimately the baseless attacks and badly reasoned conclusions, the accumulation of all these serious faults leaves no doubt in my mind that this is an intentional attempt to inflict extreme harm on the Polisario Front and the Western Saharan cause by purposely distorting the historical record.

While most of the Moroccan and pro-Moroccan material floating around is so transparently propagandistic as to merit little discussion or comment, the ESISC report DEMANDS analysis and discussion because of the seemingly respectable and respected background of the author and his group and the stated serious intentions of the report. Already we are seeing references to the report to justify demonization of the Polisario Front and to lend legitimacy to Moroccan sovereignty over the territory. Fortunately, the Polisario and the SADR have responded quickly, thoroughly, and eloquently to the report, and rather than add another lengthy rebuttal to the list, I will supply links to these more-than-adequate efforts.

Recently I received a superb review of the ESISC report off the excellent Yahoo Groups site, Sahara-Update, run by Norwegian Support Committee for Western Sahara. The author of the review is a Mr. Sidi M. Omar who is identified by Sahara-Update as a “researcher in Peace and Conflict Studies [at the UNESCO Chair of Philosophy for Peace, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain] and Front Polisario's representative to the United Kingdom and Ireland.” This 25-page review is a detailed section-by-section and often page-by-page debunking of the report and does a commendable job of setting the record straight. In addition, off the indispensable arso.org site, I recently read an official 9-page letter under the SADR letterhead by Malainin Ahmed, the Director of Political Affairs and Information, Saharawi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which highlights the most outrageous failings of Moniquet’s report.

I would, however, like to supplement these Polisario sources with a few comments on aspects of the ESISC report that I find particularly despicable.

The backbone of the Polisario case for self-determination is the designation of the Western Sahara as a non-self-governing territory. Morocco’s challenge to this status was their assertion that before colonization by the Spanish the territory was part of Morocco, and thus with Spain’s departure it should revert back to Morocco. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1975 clearly shot down the Moroccan view by ruling that the evidence did not support Moroccan territorial sovereignty and that the Western Sahara had the right to choose their own future. From almost the moment the ICJ ruling appeared, Morocco has attempted to turn it on its head by claiming that it in fact was a ruling in THEIR favor – that the bonds of allegiance mentioned by the ICJ between some of the tribes and the Sultan actually constituted bonds of territorial sovereignty between Morocco and the whole territory. This creative Moroccan misinterpretation of the ICJ ruling has been since 1975 the hallmark of Moroccan propaganda. For the ESISC to state that the ICJ “following a debate within the UN General Assembly… handed down a judgment recognizing that bonds of allegiance had existed between the tribes of the Sahara and the sultans of Morocco,” and then to ignore the rest of the ruling is clearly dishonest, but more importantly clearly revealing of a bias in favor of Moroccan lies and propaganda.

Similarly the obsessive and tortured attempt by the ESISC to brand the Polisario a dangerous extreme-left-wing group is both dishonest and indicative of a bizarre attachment to Moroccan propaganda. As Shelley in Endgame in the Western Sahara states, “The suggestion that El Ouali and associates [the founders of the Polisario] were closet Marxists who hid their schemes for social engineering and apostasy until they had lured Sahrawis to the Tindouf camps is… unappealing.” The explicit rejection of communism by the Polisario and the refusal of the Soviet Union to support or even recognize the Polisario makes one wonder why the ESISC would even start down this path of inquiry. Shelley states, “To this day, Morocco and its supporters continue to assert that the founders of the Polisario were Leninist, Guevarist, Maoist cadres.” For the ESISC to parrot the old Moroccan cold war lines truly makes one wonder the extent to which they are in bed with Rabat. The ESISC’s communist argument reaches its ultimate absurdity with its quote of Juan Vives, “a former high-level manager of the Cuban intelligence services,” that the Polisario was “developed by Cuba … by Che in person.” Claude Moniquet apparently doesn’t have a problem with the fact that the Polisario was born in 1973 and Che died in 1967.

Another major criticism I have of the ESISC report is that to make its case it relies inordinately on interviews with a handful of Polisario defectors without even one interview with a member of the Polisario. Furthermore, the researchers do not appear to have visited either the refugee camps in Tindouf or the occupied territories. Shelley’s treatment of the Polisario – which includes testimony from defectors, current members of the Polisario leadership, and Sahrawi in both Tindouf and the territories – is, to say the least, far more even-handed. The Morocco Times recently reported that Claude Moniquet was planning to sue the independent Moroccan weekly Le Journal Hebdomadaire for defamation for stating that his report was “guided” by Morocco, “only reiterates the official theses of Morocco,” and “is a document made to please the Moroccan authorities.” In a delicious piece of irony, the Morocco Times reported further that according to Moniquet, “the weekly – Le Journal Hebdomadaire – did not respect the main bases of journalism, that is, contacting a person before writing about them.” One is, once again, left to wonder why it apparently never occurred to Moniquet to contact the Polisario before writing about THEM.

It is hard to read the ESISC report without wondering about motives. Why in the world would Claude Moniquet jeopardize his reputation by publishing such a blatantly compromised analysis? As an acknowledged expert on terrorism why does he choose to go after a group that has no history at all of terrorist activity, while fully supporting and repeating the propaganda of a country with a long history of state terrorism? Why does he feel compelled to bend and ignore the truth to the extent that he does? Why has he decided on autonomy for the territory as the only solution, when international law clearly stipulates self-determination? I wonder about these and many other things, but do not pretend to know the answers. I know only that the ESISC report on the Polisario Front is an intentionally malicious and grotesquely immoral piece of work with no scholarly merit that should be soundly condemned.

Thursday, December 22, 2005

Hale and Neo-colonialism

Hale in his Bloggin' the Maghreb in a recent posting "I Don't Trust the Polisario" makes this argument: 1) "my wish is that the Sahrawi wind up with as much freedom and justice as is possible. 2)"I have now come to the conclusion that Polisario can not to be trusted to lead the Sahrawi in a free and democratic country." 3) "The Sahrawi deserve better than Polisario." 4) ergo, the Western Sahara must be ruled by Morocco. This argument doesn't hold sand for all kinds of reasons.

Reason 1

His demonization of the Polisario is based on Moroccan propaganda and cheap-shot hatchet jobs such as the recent report on the Polisario by the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center (ESISC). While I will deal in detail with ESISC in a future posting, I refer you here to the chapter titled "Polisario and the SADR" in Toby Shelley's recent book, "Endgame in the Western Sahara," which is a far more balanced and sane treatment of what is in most respects a "model" national liberation movement.

Reason 2

Hale holds the Polisario to standards that Morocco doesn't come close to meeting. He criticizes the Polisario for lack of democracy, when Morocco is run by a corrupt and autocratic monarchy accountable to no one. He accuses the Polisario of torture, when Human Rights Watch and others have written extensively about Moroccan torture. He doesn't trust the Polisario, when the monarchy has a long sad history of lying and duplicity. In the final analysis, Hale is just hypocritical.

Reason 3

Hale's argument that the Western Sahara should be part of Morocco for the good of the Saharawi people is just plain neo-colonial and patronizing. Here are my comments from Hale's Blog.

Hale writes: "But in this case, Morocco is definitely the lesser of evils. And I firmly believe that the Sahrawi have a much better chance for a good life under Morocco than under Polisario."

But isn't this the logic of the colonizer? The colonizer always feels that it is providing a better life for the colonized. There was a time that the French felt strongly that their rule over Morocco provided a better life for the Moroccans; and you can probably make a good argument that they were indeed providing a better life for the Moroccans. According to your reasoning France should have denied independence to Morocco. And didn't the slaveowner before the American Civil War also argue that he was providing a better life for the slave.

My point is of course that international law just does not allow the stronger, more viable, or more democratic countries to invade and rule over what they consider "lesser" countries. That Morocco might provide a better life for the Saharawi (which I vehemently contest by the way) is absolutely no reason to deny the Saharawi the same right to self-determination that Morocco enjoyed.

It is not for you or for Morocco to choose. All the Western Saharans have ever wanted is the referendum that has been promised them, so they can choose.

Wednesday, December 21, 2005

Western Sahara Endgame

As is obvious to anyone who keeps up on the rather limited written material available on the Western Sahara, the name of this blog derives from the title of Toby Shelley’s excellent recent book, Endgame in the Western Sahara. The Western Sahara’s post-colonial history seems to be fitting neatly into three broad stages: 1) the war years 1975-1991 from the Moroccan invasion until the cease-fire when little or no negotiating took place between the parties and they fought themselves to a draw; 2) the referendum years 1991-2003 from the first attempts to compile a voting list under the cease-fire agreement through the Houston Accords to the resignation of James Baker and Morocco’s rejection of the Baker II Plan; 3) and starting in 2003 the endgame.

The challenge of the endgame is to find a way out of this mess without resorting to war and without negotiation between the two parties. I say “without resorting to war” because the Polisario is all too aware that a return to arms would be useless and suicidal -- that their ability to prevail against vastly superior Moroccan numbers and resources is non-existent. And because a return to arms could very easily escalate into a fratricidal war between Morocco and Algeria, the world community would pull out all the stops to keep violence in check. I say “without negotiation” because the Polisario, by accepting the Baker II Plan that would result in a referendum heavily slanted in Morocco’s favor, has given just about all that they can give short of giving up the struggle; and Morocco, by rejecting the Plan, was forced to admit that they had no intention of ever allowing a referendum under any circumstances. With the death of Baker II there is no longer anything left to negotiate.

The new endgame paradigm involves strategic shifts on all fronts. For the Western Saharans we have seen a dramatic shift of the axis of their struggle from Tindouf to the occupied territories where demonstrations have been taking place with increasing regularity. Predictably Morocco has responded with more troops and increased repression. On the Moroccan front, Rabat has greatly ratcheted-up the public relations war with a world-wide propaganda and misinformation campaign to discredit and demonize the Polisario. Another notable aspect of Morocco’s endgame is the King’s first serious mention of autonomy for the Western Sahara as a possible solution. Predictably the Polisario immediately and vehemently rejected this overture.

Internationally, the UN has once again extended MINURSO, this time for six months until the end of April 2006. And the Security Council has once again signed on to a referendum plan, this time Baker II. Ironically, the UN’s endorsement of Baker II probably signals the end of the UN’s primacy in the conflict resolution process. It has been a long road for the UN from the original designation of the Spanish Sahara as a non-self-governing territory in the 60’s to their call for a referendum in the 70’s to their facilitation of the first negotiations between the parties in the 80’s to the Cease-fire Agreement and Houston Accords in the 90’s to the Baker II Plan in the 00’s. To the UN’s credit they have for over forty years stuck to their guns in insisting that this is purely a de-colonization issue and that the Western Sahara has the right to self-determination and a referendum. Any further retreat by the UN from Baker II would inevitably involve a rejection of self-determination for the Western Saharans, and I see no indications that the UN would take this drastic and ignominious step. All told, the consistent refusal of two members of the Security Council, France and the United States, to pressure Morocco to abide by UN resolutions has resulted in a greatly reduced role for the UN in the endgame.

Thus, for the world community, the endgame will be played out not in New York, but in Washington, Paris, Madrid, and the other capitals that have a stake or interest in the issue. The elevation of John Bolton to be US Representative to the UN (at least for the moment) is an impoortant move in the endgame. As Baker’s assistant in the Western Saharan negotiations, Bolton is by far the most knowledgeable member of the Bush administration on the issue, and he is on record as supporting a referendum. The fact that he is a rabid unilateralist and an anti-UN zealot reinforces my contention that Bolton will try to solve the issue from Washington not New York. Whether he can overcome the very strong American friendship with Morocco is of course the big question. Recognition of the SADR by South Africa and Kenya have been major recent successes for the Polisario. But outside of Africa, the SADR still doesn’t have the big country support necessary to turn the screws on Morocco.

To read much of the Moroccan and pro-Moroccan material on the Western Sahara issue is to understand the often-repeated dictum that if you repeat lies often enough people start believing them. The prime example of this is Morocco’s position on the ruling of the International Court of Justice in 1975. Despite the fact that the Court unambiguously concluded that it did ”not support Morocco’s claim to have exercised territorial sovereignty over Western Sahara,” Morocco from almost the moment the ruling came out has insisted that the ICJ ruled in its favor and thus supported their invasion and hegemony. Morocco has been spreading this lie for over thirty years now, and it is with much dismay that I read a lengthy report on the Polisario Front dated November 2005 and written by a serious-sounding group called the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center that sure enough justifies Moroccan sovereignty by citing the ICJ ruling.

Now that the endgame is upon us it is more important than ever to make sure that Morocco’s sleazy misinformation campaign does not go unanswered. Western Sahara Endgame is my small contribution to this effort.